Insubstantial pageants fading : a critical exploration of epiphanic discourse, with special reference to three of Robert Browning's major religious poems by Keep, Carol Julia
INSUBSTANTIAL PAGEANTS FADING: A CRITICAL EXPLORATION OF EPIPHANIC DIScouRSE, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THREE OF ROBERT SROWNING'S MAJOR RELIGIOUS PoEMS 
by 
CAROL JULIA KEEP 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
in the subject 
ENGLISH 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR E R HARTY 
NOVEMBER 1994 
i 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation examines the nature of epiphanic discourse in 
three of Robert Browning's religious poems, namely, 'Christmas-
Eve', 'Easter-bay' and 'La Saisiaz'. 
Chapter 1 investigates epiphany from religious, historical 
and theoretical perspectives, followed by a discussion of 
Browning's developing Christian beliefs. Chapters 2 and 3 
explore the epiphanic moment in the companion poems, 'Christmas-
Eve' and 'Easter-DayF. Chapter 4 explores how the double epiphany 
initiated from Browning's personal experience recounted in 'La 
Saisiaz', finds its resolution in '~he Two Poets of Croisic'. 
Browning's 'good minute' or 'infinite moment' originates 
in Romanticism and reverberates into the twentieth century mainly 
in the writing of James Joyce, who first used the word 'epiphany' 
in its literary sense. 
Because Browning's faith allowed continual interrogation of 
Christian doctrine, his experience and reading of epiphanic 
moments avoid any attempt at closure. Thus they offer the reader 
both a human image for recognition and a coded legend for 
individual interpretation. 
'Christmas-Eve'; 'Easter-Day'; epiphanic; epiphany; 'La Saisiaz'; 
religious; Robert Browning; Romantic; 'The Two Poets of Croisic'; 
Victorian 
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INTRODUCTION 
Thought and feeling and soul and sense -
M~rged in a moment .... 
'Now' Robert Browning 
Until relatively recently, epiphany, or the moment of revelation, 
was imbued with religious significance, specifically grounded in 
the Biblical tradition. There are a few antecedents in classical 
literature, for example Plato's hallucinations or Socrates' 
chimeras, but the moment of vision leading to enlightenment is 
essentially a religious phenomenon and, in the West, particularly 
a Christian one. I believe that epiphany differs from mystical 
vision in that unlike the visionary experience in which the self 
is annihilated, the revelation is often intensely personal, with 
an emphasis on the personality of the subject rather than on the 
object revealed. 
The focus on the personality of the subject is distinctly 
Augustinian. Although in his Confessions Augustine never allows 
us to forget that his experience arose not so much out of himself 
as from an external force, he makes it clear that if the idea of 
man has existed in God from eternity, man has therefore existed 
from eternity. Time then, although an objective phenomenon, takes 
on a psychological emphasis. Augustine says: 
... the world was made, not in time, but simultaneously 
with time. For that which is made both after and before 
sometime - after that which is past, before that which 
is future .... 
(Hutchins, 1952: 325) 
The notion of the psychological coexistence of all time leads 
naturally on to the idea of the intuitive moment of inspiration, 
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which the Romantics explored. this began a gradual movement away 
from divine revelation or an external force to a concentration on 
the subjective elements of experience the mind and the 
imagination. Wordsworth's 'spots of time' in 'The Prelude' 
exemplify this in what is virtually a theory of epiphany: 
There are in our existence spots of time 
that with distinct pre-eminence retain 
A renovating virtue ... 
A virtue, by which pleasure is enhanced 
That penetrates, enables us to mount, 
When high, more high, and lifts us up, up when fallen. 
This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks 
Among those passages of life that give 
Profoundest knowledge to what point, and how, 
The mind is lord and master - outward sense 
The obedient servant of her will. Such moments 
Are scattered everywhere, taking their date 
From our first childhood. 
(12: 208 - 25) 
Although Wordsworth leaves us in no doubt that the mind is lord 
and master, I do not consider this as evidence of the 
secularisation of epiphany which many modern critics propound. 
The epiphanic experience may have its situation in the events of 
the ordinary world and its illuminative revelation emanating from 
the mind of man, but if we are to return to Augustine's statement 
that man co-existed with God from eternity, then man is first 
and essentially a spiritual being .. All revelations given to him 
emanate from the divine source within him. Further discussion on 
this issue will be found in Chapter 1, where I attempt to define 
epiphany, tracing its historical and religious roots. 
It was Joyce who first used the word 'epiphany' in a 
literary sense; thus any discussion on epiphanic discourse will 
refer to key passages in his novel Stephen Hero, where Joyce has 
his protagonist-artist adapt the religious term to literary 
purposes. I will attempt to show the very specific link between 
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Wordsworth and Joyce's use of epiphany. Reading further in the 
same section of 'The Prelude' quoted previously, we can observe 
how Wordsworth's 'efficacious spirit' of 'renovating virtue' 
abiding among certain 'passages of life' (12: 210 - 20) (perhaps 
meaning as pathways and as texts) anticipates the duplicity of 
the Joycean epiphany as something lived through, yet also 
something written down. 
In the second part of Chapter 1 my focus falls on how Robert 
Browning as a mid-century dissenting Victorian conceived the idea 
of epiphany in his poetry. Because he iived in an age of 
scepticism, he felt it necessary to test his basically optimistic 
faith by vigorous interrogation of Christian doctrine. I submit 
that his writings are sceptical and affirmative simultaneously, 
for they compel a strenuous reading, assuming an active reader 
who will participate in the struggle of the lyric voice. They 
call for the activity of a reader with choices to make - choices 
which are created by the terms of the poem itself. The active 
reader is compelled to internalize and 
processes in the act of interpretation, 
recompose the poem's 
thereby continually 
renewing its contents with fresh creative constructs. 
A parallel to the above can be drawn with Browning's vision 
of the particular moment as the medium in which man creates 
himself. His poetry is a testimony to the struggle of how a good 
moment attains a continuity beyond itself to become an infinite 
moment. The numerous epiphanic moments I have detected in his 
poems attest to his belief that man's life is measured by a 
series of momentary illuminations which, through energy and 
intensity of commitment to another person or to God, are 
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transformed into a continuous reaching out to another or towards 
this regard 
Kierkegaard 
This experience involves a leap of faith and in 
I have commented on Browning's similarity to 
and modern existentialists who apprehended the 
nineteenth-century problem of man's inability to ascertain 
the infinite. 
universal moral and religious truths through objective facts and 
reason. Individual and subjective experience can find its 
meaning only by being informed by intuition, emotion, faith and 
intensity. 
In the following chapters I have selected what I believe to 
be three of Browning's major religious poems for close scrutiny, 
namely 'Christmas-Eve' and its companion poem 'Easter-Day' and 
'La Saisiaz'. The varieties and differences in the epiphanic 
moments will be identified and analysed. Broadly speaking then, 
the first two poems reveal visionary manifestations which lead to 
the speakers' moments of enlightenment, whereas in 'La Saisiaz' 
the double epiphany arises out of internal discourse finding its 
resolution in 'The Two Poets of Croisic' to which I refer 
briefly. 
From the outset 'Christmas-Eve' and 'Easter-Day' have 
avoided popularity. The volume containing the two poems sold 
only about two hundred copies when first published. Critics 
tended to dismiss it as an aberration, or an interlude between 
better things, or as a work of 'conscience' rather than 
imagination, interesting only in what it tells us about 
Browning's ideas. Even a modern sympathetic reader like William 
can say that 'in spite of many splendid Clyde De Vane 
passages ... ', Browning's mid-century work 'was not significant, 
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for its day, and is even less ~o for ours' (1947:35). However, 
after its initial reception the poem seemed to have crept into 
people's consciousness because apart from its artistic 
innovation it seemed to characterize the dilemmas many 
nineteenth-century readers faced in an age where the Christian 
faith had become most questionable when it was most needed. Even 
Hardy, not an admirer of Browning, quotes a few lines from 
'Easter-Day' in Tess of the d'Urbervilles (1994: 104): 
you indeed opine 
That the Eternal and Divine 
Did, eighteen centuries ago, 
In very truth ... 
(229 - 32) 
Hardy no doubt expected his readers to understand the allusion 
made in this incomplete quotation. Browning's speaker in the 
original poem interrupts himself at this point to make it clear: 
. . . Enough! you know 
That all-stupendous tale, - that Birth, 
That Life, that Death .... 
(232 - 34) 
Browning offered no glib assurances of faith and the difficulties 
facing a believer are made apparent in the unsatisfactory 
resolution of 'Christmas-Eve', which anticipates the opening 
lines of 'Easter-Day': 
How very hard it is to be 
A Christian! Hard for you and me .... 
(1 - 2) 
Browning appears to be tracking his way through doubts and fears 
rather than establishing the rights of a particular sect or of 
the Higher Criticism. The confessional, essentially inward self-
conscious nature of Christianity itself, coupled with the 
evangelical and puritanical fervour of nineteenth-century 
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revivalist movements coincid~d with the self-exploratory aspect 
implicit in Romantic literature. This background provided a 
springboard for specific assessments of faith and doubt. 
When the critic George Lewes described Browning's 
achievements in 'Christmas-Eve' and 'Easter-Day' as 'a page out 
of the history of a life' (Litzinger and Smalley, 1970: 140), he 
perhaps had in mind the idea of art as the particular 
expression of a particular personality, of dramatized intuition. 
One assumption behind such a remark is the essentially expressive 
nature of poetry, which for Browning, as for Tennyson and 
Wordsworth, is at the same time epistemological. I contend then, 
that these two poems are about knowing rather than about 
knowledge, and about knowing in terms of renewed perceptions 
revealed through the epiphanic experience. 'The world, ' as 
Browning says, 'is not to be learned and thrown aside, but 
reverted to and relearned' (Pettigrew, 1981, I: 1001). 
'La Saisiaz' in Chapter 4 deals with how a tragic personal 
experience in Browning's later life gave rise to his speculations 
on death and the immortality of the soul. The poem takes the 
form of a hypothetical debate between 'Fancy' and 'Reason', 
demonstrating its balanced combination of intellectual argument 
grounded on personal experience. 'Does the soul survive the 
body? Is there God's self, no or yest' (144) are the questions 
the next four hundred lines are devoted to answering. 
When 'La Saisiaz' was published in 1878, Browning had moved 
beyond his uneasiness with the 'Higher Critics' in Germany and 
his questioning of the historicity of Jesus, to a brand of theism 
which was substantially, if not dogmatically, that of central 
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Christianity. Within these parameters I will attempt to show how 
the poem is indicative of the late nineteenth-century shift from 
the consciousness of a transcendent order which is no longer 
rationally apprehensible and explicable to a felt or sensed 
order, incapable of proof or demonstration. All is in a state of 
flux, process and change and at best our language, our art and 
our myth are but provisional constructs. 
The insubstantial pageants fade only to re-emerge and fade 
again and the epiphanies are only half realized at the end of the 
poem. Browning's belief is that what ultimately saves the world 
from total absurdity is the experience of love, the one sure 
manifestation of truth. I will attempt to demonstrate this idea 
in a brief over-view of 'The Two Poets of Croisic' where the 
unfulfilled double epiphany of 'La Saisiaz' is resolved in the 
love between men and women as paradigmatic of the love between 
God and man. 
Finally, the trajectory of this dissertation is to show 
Browning's quests to capture the infinite within the finite 
through the epiphanic moment and its subsequent coded legend, 
allowing him to approach ever closer to Ultimate Reality. 
In the writing of this dissertation I have used the Harvard 
system of reference. I have refrained from using footnotes, 
believing that any point worth mentioning is worth inclusion in 
the main body of the discussion. For the purposes of this 
dissertation I have used masculine generic terms such as 'man' 
and 'mankind' for 'humanity', and 'he' and 'him' as appellations 
for 'God', which is consistent with the Victorian world-view and 
the usage in the Browning sources. 
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The edition I have chosen to use for Browning's poems quoted 
in my dissertation is The Works of Robert Browning (Vols. I - X), 
with introd~ctions by Sir F. G. Kenyon, K.C.B., D. Litt. (Barnes 
and Noble, Inc.: New York, 1966). Browning's 'Essay on Shelley', 
the Prologues for 'ta Saisiaz' and 'The Two Poets of Croisic' are 
from Robert Browning: The Poems Vols I and II, edited by John 
Pettigrew, supplemented and completed by Thomas J. Collins, 
(Penguin Books: Harmondsworth, 1981). Quoted poetry texts by 
Wordsworth are from William Wordsworth: Poetical Works, edited by 
Thomas Hutchinson, (O.U.P.: London, 1969). All quotations from 
the above sources are referenced simply by line numbers (108 -
21) or section and line numbers (6: 121 - 38). 
Finally, I wish to thank my supervisor, Professor E.R. 
Harty, for his invaluable help and patience; Professor F.C.H. 
Rumboll for his inspiration with the title of my dissertation; 
Gary Smith, colleague, for broadening my spiritual horizons, and 
most of all my long-suffering husband for his fortitude, 
endurance and flighty fingers on the computer. 
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CHAPTER 1: EPIPHANY AND EPIPBANIC DISCOURSE 
The aim of this chapter is, first, to examine briefly the origin 
or derivation of the term 'epiphany'; secondly, to discuss the 
problematics of epiphanic discourse within an historical 
perspective; and, lastly, to focus on Browning's concept of 
the epiphanic moment. 
The term 'epiphany' derives from the Greek phanein 'to 
show', and the prepositional prefix epi, which means variably 
'on', 'over', 'at' and 'after'. 'Phanein' can also be translated 
'to bring to light' or 'to cause to appear'. In this sense it is 
the root of 'fantasy', 'phantom' and 'phenomenon'. The term 
originally referred only to the notion of literal illumination. 
The Greek forms epiphanein and epiphaneia mean respectively 'to 
manifest' and 'appearance' or 'manifestation'. 
In Greek literature and religion the term epiphaneia was 
use9 to refer to supposedly miraculous occurrences with or 
without the visible presence of a deity. In this sense the word 
referred only to a manifestation of the power of the divinity, 
not to a vision of the god itself. 
In almost all cultures, individuals have testified to 
moments of temporary divine inspiration that most often produce 
religious conviction or creative impulses. An important 
corollary to this state is its effect on the individual: •certain 
persons are supposed to be possessed from time to time by a 
spirit or deity. While the possession lasts their own personality 
lies in abeyance' 
expressed by Plato 
(Frazer, 1958: 106). A similar idea was 
in his dialogue between Socrates and Ion. 
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Socrates maintains that all good poets compose iheir poems not by 
art, but because they are inspired and possessed by a divinity 
moving in them: 
~or the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and 
there is no invention in him until he has been inspired 
and is out of his, and the mind is no longer in him .... 
(Hutchins, 1952: 144) 
Plato goes further to include the poet's audience, that we who 
hear him may know that he is not speaking of himself in his state 
of unconsciousness. God is in fact the speaker and through the 
poet, He is conversing with us. Thus, in the epiphanic experience 
the person feels as if his own will is in abeyance; as if he were 
grasped and held by a superior power. 
The most widespread historical use of the term 'epiphany' 
derives from its place in the Christian Calendar. The early 
Christians adopted January 6 as the Feast of the Epiphany to 
celebrate the manifestation of Christ's divinity to the magi. 
The magi carry away a vision of a world transformed, of a direct 
divine intervention in the affairs of humanity. The promise of 
salvation has been conveyed to them in an epiphany. As in 
earlier classical epiphany a visible manifestation of something 
invisible records the arrival of divinity on earth for the 
purpose of aiding mankind. 
Turning to the question of the problematics of epiphanic 
discourse, many literary critics of the twentieth century see a 
movement away from traditional forms of epiphanic experience 
where the interpretation of the event was fixed and determined to 
a signification of relativism and indeterminacy. In other words, 
the interpretation of the event was open-ended, allowing the 
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possibility 
that the 
departure 
of many meanings. Ashton Nichols (1987: 4) argues 
modern literary epiphany represents an important 
from forms of experience with which it has often been 
confused: divine inspiration, 
vision. He sees the modern 
religious conversion and mystical 
epiphany as a purely secular 
revelation emerging by way of the symbolist aesthetic, dominant 
in late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century 
literature. 
Langbaum (1971: 46 ff), too, characterises 'the poetry of 
experience' as a poetry that relies on the structure of human 
experience for its values, and creates a new mythos out of the 
imaginative insights into the enduring nature of things. He 
sees epiphany in this sense as discontinuous from all earlier 
forms of inspiration and as a characteristic aspect of modern 
literature. Whereas I agree that the epiphanies in literature of 
the last two centuries have been grounded in the commonplace, 
or have emanated from within the individual rather than the 
traditional divine visitation, l do not agree that these can be 
termed secular. Creating literature is not simply a logical 
exercise, but an exercise of the spirit or mind of man; it is a 
spiritual communication of the author to his audience. 
Epiphanies in literature are the revelations of the author as he 
apprehends and interprets the infinite. This need not be 
understood in terms of a specific concept of God, as in the 
Christian sense, but as an und~rstanding of the infinite, the 
spiritual, that which is beyond us. By secularising the idea of 
epiphany, we red~ce man's thought to the realm of the logical and 
the empirical. 
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Heidegger, in dealing with the distinction between epiphany 
and 'mere optics', points out that things are seen as being: 
... available to everyone, already there, no longer 
embodying any world - now man does as he pleases with 
what is available. Every being becomes an object, 
either to be beheld (new image) or to be acted upon 
(product and calculation). The original world-making 
power, Physics, degenerates into a prototype to be 
copied and imitated.... The original emerging and 
staying of energies, the phainesthai, appearing in the 
sense of a world epiphany, becomes a visibility of 
things that are already there and can be singled out. 
The eye, the vision which originally allowed -the 
dynamism of the phainesthai to presence, becomes a mere 
looking-at or a looking-over or a gaping at. Vision has 
degenerated into mere optics. 
(1961: 52) 
Vision or the epiphanic moment transcends both the secular 
and the so-called spiritual; it collapses the difference between 
the infinite and the mundane and transcends both. Critics who 
secularise the epiphanic experience 'into mere optics' reveal a 
false dichotomy which distorts more than it tells. Consequently, 
we find the sense of the world around us as we ordinarily 
experience it as out of joint, whereas, in contrast, the fulness 
of the epiphanic moment transfigures this world through 
representation and renders objects 'translucent' where something 
of great moral or spiritual significance becomes manifest. The 
locus of a manifestation defines or completes the experience even 
as it is revealed and therefore possesses significance somehow 
inseparable from its embodiment. 
From the Romantic era onwards, the epiphanic experience 
encompasses not only the aesthetic of a work of art, but also a 
view about its spiritual significance and about the nature and 
situation of the artist. Through epiphany the artist achieves 
contact with something which fosters and itself contributes 
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spiritually significant fulfilment or wholeness. This may create 
the problem of how we describe an experience in language which is 
beyond contradictions and distinctions. The artist must translate 
his heightened perception into words and audible rhythms, so from 
the very first he is influenced by verbal and rhythmic 
necessities. Because language is embedded in the space-time 
continuum, it cannot communicate directly any phenomena outside 
these co-ordinates. Thus we may conclude that in religious 
discourse, which is necessarily metaphoric, language must fail to 
reveal what is, in a sense, incommunicable. 
Because the epiphanic experience has to be trapped in 
language, the very nature of epiphanic art can make it difficult 
to say just what is being celebrated: the deep recesses beyond or 
below the subject, or the subject's uncanny powers. The very 
fact that there can only be refracted visions through the medium 
of language means that we cannot separate what is manifested from 
the medium which we have created to reveal it. Thus, language 
masks the manifestation. 
We may now ask what the nature of the manifestation is. 
Brockington states that there are personal spiritual experiences 
of two kinds: 'visionary experiences and intuitions connected 
with ordinary appearances and events. Both these kinds of 
experiences are linked with God, or, at any rate, with some power 
outside ourselves which influences and guides us' (1963: 263). It 
appears that the locus of literature shifted towards the latter 
from the outset of the Romantic era. Through the medium of both 
people and things most of the great Romantic poets saw 
themselves as articulating something greater than themselves: 
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the world, nature, being, the word of God. They were not 
concerned primarily with an expression of their own feelings. 
Thus I believe, it is a caricature to view the Romantics as 
concerned only with self-expression. According to Langbaum, the 
subject and object coalesce to create the individual experience 
that is translated into poetry. This is, in some ways, the 
central issue of epiphanic art and the Romantics recognised this. 
Many Romantic writers testified to a deeply significant 
experience in which an instant of consciousness or else 
an ordinary object or event suddenly blazes into 
revelation; the unsustainable moment seems to arrest 
what is passing, and is often described as an 
intersection of eternity with time. 
(Abrams, 1971: 421) 
M. H. Abrams calls such experiences 'moments' drawing his 
term from Augustine's momentum and the German der Moment. He 
suggests that these Romantic moments possess affinities with 
instants of inspiration recorded over the centuries and rightly 
does not make the seemingly false distinction between traditional 
revelation and the modern so-called secular counterpart. As 
previously stated, I contend that any revelation emanates from a 
spiritual source and it is the experience only which may occur 
in a religious or secular context. 
Wordsworth referred to his epiphanic moments as 'spots of 
time' ('The Prelude': 208) in which a commonplace event takes on 
a revelatory quality in the mind of the observer. Coleridge's 
flashes of inspiration and Shelley's moments of ecstasy provide 
important developments on the Wordsworthian epiphany, in that 
they begin to transcend the ordinary everyday experience, 
suggesting a greater psychic intensity and emotional importance. 
Thus they emphasise the role of the mind in such elevations of 
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ordinary events into moments of extraordinary significance. 
Further developments of the epiphanic moment occurred during 
the Victorian period. Browning's 'infinite moment' ('By the 
Fire-side': 181) reveals the mind's ability to focus emotion and 
perception in a fleeting illuminated moment. Likewise Tennyson's 
'trances' derive from an imaginative power that produces a 
'sudden spiritual manifestation' ('In Memoriam', 95: 36) out of 
an otherwise ordinary object or event. Arnold's 'gleaming' 
moments continue the movement on toward~ the twentieth century 
('Dover Beach': 3 - 4). 
James Joyce was not the first person to appropriate the term 
'epiphany' into his aesthetic and literary theory. It was in fact 
Emerson who expanded the meaning of the term in the nineteenth 
century by referring to 'facts, dull, strange, despised things' 
which the aroused intellect finds to be 'an Epiphany of God': 
Day creeps after day, each full of facts, dull, strange 
despised things that we cannot enough despise, call 
heavy, prosaic and desart. The time we seek to kill. 
The attention it is elegant to divert from things around 
us. And presently the aroused intellect finds gold and 
gems in one of these scorned facts, then finds that the 
day of facts is a rock of diamonds, that a fact is an 
Epiphany of God, that on every fact of his life he 
should rear a temple of wonder and joy. 
(Spiller and Williams, 1971: 47) 
The idea of the mind's ability to produce meaning and value 
out of a seemingly insignificant event reveals an important 
strand of nineteenth-century thought that connects the 
Wordsworthian 'spot of time' through Emerson to the Joycean 
epiphany. 
Joyce defines his epiphanic mod~ in Stephen Hero when 
Stephen Daedalus is discussing his desire to collect trivial 
incidents which possess a unique intensity into a volume of 
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epiphanies: 
By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual 
manifestation, whether in vulgarity of speech or of 
gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. 
(1963: 211) 
Joyce's definition suggests a return to the original, literal 
meaning of the Greek term that referred to appearances, 
illuminations based on actual light and physical objects 
sudd~nly revealed. 
Again, in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man Joyce 
defines the artist's role in the epiphanic moment as that of 'a 
priest of the eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of 
experience into the radiant body of everliving life' (1954: 252). 
The daily bread the commonplace becomes revelatory and 
epiphanic at the point where it takes on a radiance of something 
beyond itself. This process occurs in the mind where the raw 
data of consciousness are transformed into illuminated 
manifestations of meaning. It should be noted, that in such 
moments of transformed consciousness, whether visionary or 
intuitive, the interpretations tend to speak in equivocal ways. 
In other words, the interpretation is open-ended, allowing a free 
flow of many meanings. 
Joyce uses the word 'epiphany' as a critical term in Stephen 
and appears to have adopted it because of his full 
agreement with the Romantic tendency to associate all 
manifestations of divinity with the creative spirit of man. But 
Joyce seems to have thought of the basis of the epiphany, in its 
literary context, as an actual event brought into contact with 
the creative imagination but untouched by it, so that it 
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preserves the sense of something contained by the imagination and 
yet actual in its own terms. 
Wordsworth was the great pioneer, almost the discoverer, 
of epiphany in this sense, as something observed but not 
essentially altered by the imagination, which yet has 
crucial significance for that imagination. 
( Frye , 1 9 6 S : 15 S ) 
Frye sees such experiences as important because of their ability 
to produce 'an association between the random and the oracular' 
(1968: 159). In Anatomy of Criticism, Frye connects epiphany 
with an 'archetypal' form of criticism, that is, one that rests 
on a theory of myths. In this context he characterises the 'point 
of epiphany', which he parallels to the Wordsworthian spot of 
time, as a point at which the 'undisplaced apocalyptic world 
and the cyclical world of nature come into alignment' (1971: 
223). 
It is therefore evident that Joyce's goal, like 
Wordsworth's, is the production of a kind of astonishment in his 
readers. The object is suddenly revealed as an interaction 
between the world and the mind. 'lts soul, its whatness, leaps to 
us from the vestments of its appearances. The soul of the 
commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to 
us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany.' (Joyce, 1961:118). 
The world provides the objects and the sensitive imagination 
provides the radiant point of epiphany. In this intuitive 
epiphany the visible reveals something invisible, but the status 
of the invisible component is not fixed in meaning and its 
mystery or open-endedness becomes part of the value of the 
experience. 
The epiphanic experience may be private and subjective 
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insofar as it originates in the mind and emotions of the poet, 
but its power, its tone and ability to radiate significance are 
not limited by its origins in a particular mind. That is why any 
reader of an epiphanic experience becomes a potential participant 
in the intuitive experience, for its lack of closure allows the 
reader to complete the epiphany in his own mind. The event is 
fixed and definite but the •pageant fades' , opening up to a 
multitude of interpretations without challenging the powerful 
moment itself. 
There has been a shift from the pre-Romantic visionary type 
of epiphanic experience to the Romantic and Modern intuitive 
moment. The possibility of this form of revelation emerges in 
part from the profound changes that were occurring in the early 
nineteenth-century conceptions of time. For centuries time had 
been seen as an unbroken linear flow sustained in its continuity 
by the mind of God, and moving from the beginning of the Universe 
to a final apocalyptic end with the single human life assumed 
within it. The Judaeo-Christian tradition calls this kind of 
time 'teleological', i.e. heading for a predestined end. Georges 
Poulet has argued that an emphasis on continuous time was 
replaced by an emphasis on time conceived in momentary terms; 
It is the greatness of the eighteenth century to have 
conceived the prime moment of consciousness as a 
generating moment and generative not only of other 
moments but also of a self which takes shape by and 
through the means of these very moments. 
(1956: 23} 
This generating of self within the generating moment was one 
of the reasons why the Romantics abandoned themselves to the most 
fleeting emotions, as in Wordsworth's 'spots of time'. Browning's 
'infinite moment' likewise emerges from the idea that a moment 
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can suggest limitless duration. It seems then that Romanticism 
distinguishes two different conceptions of time, one which 
chronologically orders events, and the other which evaluates 
experience on the basis of its atemporal significance. 
Frank Kermode has adopted two theological terms to describe 
these two senses of time: chronos, or chronological time, and 
kairos, or imaginative time. This latter term is given to 
moments of significance. Chronos time is relentlessly passing 
and can never be recaptured, whereas kairos time can overcome 
chronos with the possibility of momentary mental redemption. 
Kermode says of Wordsworth's capturing moments in time: 
The hiding places of power, for Wordsworth ... are the 
agents of time's defeat, discovered by involuntary 
memory, pure of discursive significance like the girl 
with the pitcher, they provide the structure and meaning 
and pleasure which constitute our deliverance from the 
long meaningless attrition of time. 
(1967: 169) 
The 'structure and meaning and pleasure' of the epiphanic 
moment allows for the large number of associations that are 
focused in a single moment. For the Romantic, the self is 
re-created through an intense short-lived transcend~nt moment, 
and the multiplicity of meanings after it has faded increases the 
potential value. 
J. Hillis Miller suggests a continuity of moments over the 
past two centuries in terms of what h'e calls the 'linguistic 
moment'. He points out that: 
... in poems from Wordsworth to Stevens ... the intrinsic 
equivocations of ordinary language interfere with the 
expression of a univocal meaning. 
(1985: 55) 
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The equivocal language allows the moment to offer many 
interpretations and, in this way, the words manifest the power of 
language to reify experience, although, as I have mentioned, even 
the power of language must fail to communicate adequately the 
essentially incommunicable of the transcendental realm. 
So we can see that the epiphanic mode can take a variety of 
forms and display varying tendencies within these forms. 
Wordsworth's 'spots of time' are not 
'good moment'; Shelley's fleeting 
identical to Browning's 
upward flights are not 
equivalent 
these forms 
to 
of 
Coleridge's 'flashes'. 8ut the similarities in 
epiphany are greater than the differences which 
separate them. All epiphanic moments involve a way of evaluating 
the experience of objects of the common world being transformed 
and transfigured through the creative imagination. 
The problem of the epiphanic moment in literature is that it 
cannot be declared significant until it assumes verbal form. In 
its verbal form it attempts two things: to point beyond language, 
to beyond the text, so that it may have meaning in the minds of 
the readers, and reveal the ways in which language can attempt 
to manifest the essence of experience. This individual experience 
passes into the realm of the symbolic when the reader relates the 
epiphany to the wider details of experience. In the process, the 
individ~al reader/poet engages in a multifarious search for the 
meaning of existence and his/her experience of the world achieves 
a new open-end~d significance. 
From considerations of t&e nature of epiphany and the 
epiphanic mode, I will attempt to examine briefly Browning's 
religious beliefs from which emanate his 'infinite moment'. 
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Over the 
Browning's 
last century there 
religious standpoint 
has been much debate on what 
was. This is due, I think, to 
lrowning's unorthodox religion and to the dramatic versatility of 
his mind which represents not an impediment, but a key to his 
ideas concerning ultimate reality and meaning. In 1891 Mrs 
Sutherland Orr initiated debate in the Contemporary R.eview for 
the December of that year with an article entitled 'The Religious 
Opinions of Robert Browning'. She believed that the clue to 
Browning's heterodoxy was his exclusion of any belief in 
historical revelation. Her conclusion was based on a 
misunderstanding of arowning's distrust in reason to undergird 
faith. William O. Raymond (1919: 609 - 10) rightly points out 
that firstly, arowning's canon and the evidence of his life 
refute this. Secondly, Raymond contends that his staunch 
affirmation of the spiritual significance of the Incarnation and 
Christ's sacrifice on the Cross override any of Browning's 
supposed intellectual agnosticism in dealing with Christianity as 
an historical revelation. 
Another critic of Browning's religious position is worth 
noting briefly, particularly for his views on the poet as a 
philosopher a title which Browning seemed never to have 
claimed. ln 1891 Henry Jones charged the poet with severing 
feeling from intelligence in order to be able to ignore 
intellectual arguments when they encountered his emotional 
optimism. 
order of a 
It appears that Jones, in his zeal for the systematic 
philosopher, ignores the techniques of a poet who 
non-rational religious considerations, such as love 
human beings and the importance of existential choice. 
embraced 
between 
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The tentativeness of irowning's questions and his open-minded, 
unprejudiced search for answers conflicted with Jones's rigorous 
philosophic system. 
Another factor which contributed to the discussion of 
Browning's religious opinions may be that, during the century in 
which he lived, people were witnessing profound changes in 
scientific, humanistic and religious thought about the world, the 
self, and the reciprocal relations between them. J. Hillis 
Miller's provocative article 'The Theme of the Disappearance of 
God in Victorian Poetry' describes the Victorian Age thus: 
tife in the city, the breakings of mediaeval symbolism, 
the imprisoning of man in his consciousness, the 
appearance of the historical sense - each of these is 
another way in which modern man has experienced the 
disappearance of God, and taken together they form the 
essential background against which much Victorian 
literature must be seen. 
(1963: 211) 
I believe that Miller is wrong here. God did not disappear in 
Victorian England; it is perhaps doubt that became more 
widespread. The historian G. Kitson Clark supports my contention 
in a chapter of his· book concerning life in Victorian times. He 
maintains, in fact, that the years following 1859 saw a number of 
great religious revivals in the nation, challenging men and women 
of every class and level of education. He goes on to mention that 
the revival 'in all its forms Anglican, Roman Catholic and 
Protestant Nonconformist gave shape and meaning to many lives 
which otherwise would have had none' (1965: 196}. 
Nevertheless, being of the age, Browning in a sense did 
perhaps experience a withdrawal of God, the impossibility of a 
face-to-face confrontation with God, which diminished man's life 
and impoverished his spirit. But this incompleteness prevents the 
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completeness of stagnation and death. Norton B. Crowell (1968: 
229) rightly says that man's doubt and uncertainty, his 
incompleteness, is the foundation stone in the whole structure of 
God's plan which spurs man on the earthly road toward heavenly 
perfection. Thus, far from affirming that man and his 
surroundings are impoverished by God's plan, Browning never 
ceased to emphasise in his poetry the idea of existential and 
dynamic growth toward God, toward truth and toward the larger and 
nobler life - always through doubt and imperfection and trial. He 
believed that the prize is in the process, not in the attainment. 
Life is a series of challenges which culminates in Death's 
summons, whilst Death itself is the passage to immortality. In 
that transformed state, the inevitable unevenness of life's 
passage would be straightened and refined. Added to this 
completing process, behind all the drive and struggle of living, 
is divine love. Later in this dissertation, I will demonstrate 
and verify these assertions of arowning in the analyses of his 
three major religious poems. 
there is much the same realisation in Duffin. He pin-points 
Browning's attitude thus: 
The feeling for life, the joyous acceptance of the whole 
of life, which gives the poems their characteristic 
colour, is a vivid thing beside what had been called 
Tennyson's 'terrified denial of pessimism' The 
pronouncements on life are preponderantly sober, but the 
sky is lighted by courage and faith. 
(1956: 252) 
Browning's 'preponderantly sober' outlook reveals an 
understanding of that duality in us which is the source of 
conflict in the soul between good and evil. Even many of his 
casuistic characters of the dramatic monologues, in their worst 
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moments, were able to apprehend the inherent good in themselves, 
for example, Andrea del Sarto, Cleon and Thamuris. Conversely, 
~rowning's courage, hope and faith have caused him to be 
labelled as an optimist. Herbert Tucker (1980: 184) believes that 
the term 'meliorist' describes his stance more accurately, for 
Browning believed in the best of all possible worlds, only and 
precisely as a possibility: one that was situated in the future, 
from which it highlighted and criticised the shortcomings of 
the present. 'God's in his heaven,' Pippa famously sings, 
'All's right with the world' ('Pippa Passes': 227-8). But her 
song falls on the ear of Sebald, an adulterous murderer whose 
no better recourse than suicide. awakened conscience finds 
This hardly endorses the 
Pippa and Sebald alike! 
clear-sighted power of 
rightness of the world that contains 
This is no facile optimism but a 
seeing the world 'warts and all'. 
Browning's optimism is not the cause of his religious 
convictions: rather, his conviction is the root of his optimism. 
Because the Victorians believed that God's immanence was 
lost to their world and the gap between man and divine power 
seemed great, man could experience the transcendent God only in 
finite moments of enlightenment. Moreover, Browning realized the 
failure of the finite to encompass the infinite; his emphasis on 
the brevity of the infinite moment still involves incompleteness 
and dissatisfaction. No finite moment, however intense, can have 
the full plenitude of God, or a complete possession of another 
person. This is why Browning insists on multiple perspectives in 
his poetry, on many infinite moments. This will be d~monstrated 
particularly in his dramatic lyric, 'La Saisiaz'. 
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From these infinite moments something else appears; 
something which can never be said directly in words. The 
'something' is at once the central truth of the human condition 
and the transcendental truth which underlies all particular human 
facts. Through these 'insubstantial pageants', we may reach at 
last God's own infinite perspective. But this again is bound to 
fail, for Browning believed that on earth we 'see through a glass 
darkly' (I Co r . 13 : 12 ) , yet in this failure lies unexpected 
success. Man's perpetual striving is his most God-like attribute. 
For Browning the individual and his experience of life 
was of the utmost importance. He saw the self defined not by the 
events of its life but by its moments of assertion and 
commitment . In a letter to Julia Wedgewood he writes of: 
. . . the rare flashes of momentary conviction that come 
and go in the habitual dusk and driubt of one's life .... 
(Curle, 1937: 29) 
The poem 'Now', which was written towards the end of his life 
states this conviction that shapes so much of his earlier poetry: 
Out of your whole life give but a moment! 
All of your life that has gone before, 
All to come after it, - so you ignore, 
So you make perfect the present, - cond~nse, 
In a rapture of rage, for perfection's endowment, 
Thought and feeling and soul and sense -
Merged in a moment .... 
(1 - 7) 
This moment of crisis which absorbs past and future can reveal 
the meaning of a man's life in an intense consciousness of the 
present. Such experiences are characterised by thought and 
feeling, not by a sustained ratiocination that can be 
discursively articulated. Here we can see the influence of the 
Romantic movement on Browning's poetry. Thus, the intensity which 
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derives from the ability of the epiphanic moment to transcend 
chronological time, makes the experiences stand out from ordinary 
consciousness. 
Whenever the epiphanic moment occurs, it will be a moment 
when a man's inner power shows itself in its most essential form. 
In a letter to Elizabeth 8arrett in February 1845 Browning 
describes his poetry: 
... like the light in those crazy Mediterranean phares 
wherein the light is ever revolving in a dark 
gallery, bright and alive, and only after a weary 
interval leaps out, for a moment, from the narrow chink, 
and then goes on with the blind wall between it and you. 
(Kintner, 1969, I: 17) 
This 'narrow chink' occurs when the poet transcends the temporal 
world and experiences a vision or intuition of the infinite for a 
moment, before returning to the ordinary 'blind' world. The 
memory of the experience may last, but the intensity of the 
feeling fades. Roma ling describes 8rowning's balance between 
the ordinary and the extraordinary as art that: 
... fix es firmly on this world. including man• s 
activities, indeed, but at the same time imbuing his 
efforts with a boundless significance. 
(1968: xxiii) 
This 'boundless significance' includes the declaration of a soul 
aware of its place in the universe. In his 'Preface to Sordello' 
Browning says: 'My stress lay on the incidents in the development 
of a soul: little else is worth study' (288). Once the moment 
has come in which the soul has declared and defined itself by the 
things it does, events are insignificant. Character after 
character in Browning's world reveal and commit themselves in a 
moment's deed. 'Childe Roland', the lovers in 'In a Gondola', or 
'The Last Ride Together' are named and known in a single moment 
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of commitment, while the worst failures of Browning's world, such 
as the lovers of 'The Statue and the Bust' or 'Youth and Art' are 
those who fail to seize their moment and commit themselves to it. 
It is worth noting that many of his poems are suddenly truncated, 
ending with the characters' assertion of commitment, and the 
progress of events is never completed. Each of the characters 
has committed an act that validates his whole life and any event 
after that, despite its consequences, will not affect that moment 
or that identity. 
This commitment has been found by critics to be similar to 
modern existentialism, particularly to the Kierkegaardian 'leap 
of faith' . For Kierkegaard, as for Browning, the defining 
reality of a man's life is the instant of private commitment. 
This idea seems to emanate from a growing conviction in the 
nineteenth century that universal religious and moral truths 
could not be wrested from objective reason but only through the 
certainty of intense, individual and particular experience. 
Christopher Clausen has observed from the Romantics through to 
the Victorians that 
The truths of poetry that seemed to wear best were no 
longer the 'great truths' of which Wordsworth spoke in 
'The Prelude'. but rather flashes of insight into 
experience, highly focused clarifications of life ... 
amalgams of thought and feeling expressed in lyric form. 
(1981: 706) 
Only by intuition, emotion, faith and intensity could the 
connection between the general and the particular be revealed. 
Browning, like Kierkegaard, sees the intensity of commitment 
creating an answering revelation from God. This I will attempt 
to show in the analyses of three dramatic lyrics in the following 
three chapters. 
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Thus, the energy which flows from the intensity of the 
epiphanic moment enables man to make the leap out of the 
temporal, in which experience is confined, and into the infinite. 
Man must throw himself entirely into the particular moment with 
all the energy he possesses. It is the intensity of man's 
striving, the force of his energy and love, that enables these 
moments to suggest a passage from the temporal to the eternal. 
For example, in 'Cristina', Browning shows how temporality is 
transcended by the epiphanic moment. 
Doubt you if, in some moment, 
As she fixed me, she felt clearly, 
Ages past the soul existed, 
Here an age 'tis resting merely, 
And hence fleets again for ages .... 
And then, come the next life quickly. 
(33 - 37; 69) 
This kind of moment provides a sense of immortality at least for 
the soul capable of love. Two souls, by virtue of having once 
loved, will love forever. In contrast to this, 'Porphyria's 
Lover' perverts this view by trying to preserve the epiphanic 
moment in an inverted sense. In the warped mentality of the 
lover, the epiphanic moment leads not to immortal love, but to 
murder. He kills Porphyria because he wants her for ever as he 
saw her in an instant as his: a body that would be beside him 
always. As a result the epiphany becomes ironic: 
- she, 
Too weak, for all her heart~s endeavour, 
To set its struggling passion free 
From pride, and vainer ties dissever, 
And give herself to me for ever . 
... at last I knew 
Porphyria worshipped me; surprise 
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M~d~ my heart swell, and still it grew 
While I debated what to do. 
That moment she was mine, mine, fair, 
Perfectly pure and good: I found 
A thing to do .... 
This demonstrates that the epiphanic moment is always threatened 
by failure if one tries to hold on to it or capture it. That is 
why the lover in 'Two in the Campagna' who longs for a feeling of 
permanence, loses his emotion as soon as he achieves it. The 
'good minute' arrives only to be snatched from him by the flow of 
his own rational thought: 
. . . I pluck the rose 
And love it more than tongue can speak -
Then the good minute goes. 
(48 - 50) 
The 'good minute' when he catches the warmth of his lover's soul 
in his love for the rose fades as he attempts to interpret its 
meaning. In the end the speaker gains only a sense of the finite 
limitations and the infinite nature of his longings. For an 
epiphany to last, it must issue from a powerful perception of the 
present and the mingled associations of the past, which can both 
exist in the intensely realised instant. 
~rowning's vision of the particular moment as the medium in 
which man creates himself, leads to the problem of how the moment 
attains a continuity beyond itself; how a 'good moment' can 
become an 'infinite moment'. In 'By the Fire-side' the poet 
suggests how to achieve and preserve the intensity of a moment. 
The speaker muses on the walk he and his lover took through the 
Italian countryside, which confirmed their love. They are 
suddenly halted by a powerful perception that gives way to an 
intense emotion: 
29 
Oh moment, one and infinite! 
The water slips o'er stock and stone; 
The West is tender, hardly bright: 
How grey at once is the evening grown -
One star, its chrysolitef 
A moment after, and hands unseen 
Were hanging the night around us fast; 
But we knew that a bar was broken between 
Life and life: we were mixed at last 
In spite of the mortal screen. 
(181 - 185; 2~1 - 215) 
The mysteriousness of the connection between the elements of 
perception come without will or even anticipation. 1he two 
lovers can achieve a spiritual mystification in an act of grace 
that resists rational definition and is characterised by a 
feeling of timelessness. Even 'A moment after' the initial power 
of the feeling fades, it leaves something of its value behind. 
In the multiple epiphanies of life, man can achieve a focus 
of all these facet-flashes; a unity identified with God. The 
Ring and the Book suggests a synthesis that can be identified 
with truth, all the more powerful because of its multeity. Learn 
and love, Browning says, not only each individual and powerful 
experience, but: 
gach facet-flash of the revolving year! -
Red, green and blue that whirl into a white, 
1he variance now, the eventual unity, 
Which make the miracle. 
(X: 1361 - 64) 
Conversely, too, just as one facet-flash can suggest infinity 
because of its seemingly limitless associations - Browning's 
'infinite moment' so one fragment of experience can imply a 
whole, of which it is only a suggestive part. 1he Pope, who is 
the speaker of the monologue, suggests that man's mind is but a 
reflection of the infinite truths of God's mind revealed to us in 
fragments of knowledge which re-unite into a coherent symbol of 
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the eternal: 
Man's mind, what is it but a convex glass 
Wherein are gathered all the scattered points 
Picked out of the immensity of sky, 
To re-unite there, be our heaven for earth, 
Our known unknown, our God revealed to man? 
(X: 1311 - 15) 
During the epiphanic moment a focus is achieved through an 
image which possesses a mysteriousness; a spiritual quality. The 
effect is always one of revelation or manifestation which 
transcends the world of objects into the infinite and the 
eternal. 
Thus, we can see a development from Wordsworth's 
autobiographical experience to Browning's epiphanic moment in 
which the location of the experience occurs within the 
consciousness of a character. The 'insubstantial pageant' of the 
epiphany fades, with emotion subverting interpretation, giving 
rise to meaning(s) only after the event. During the epiphanic 
moment a focus is achieved through an image which possesses a 
mysteriousness, a spiritual quality. The effect is always one of 
revelation or manifestation which transcends the world of 
objects transforming this world into the infinite and eternal. 
arowning's ability to unite the individual and the concrete 
with the infinite is succinctly summarised by Duckworth who 
contends that his contemplative qualities as a poet see 
... each minute sealed with the mark of the infinite and 
eternal because the infinite and eternal include and 
swallow up the finite and temporal. 
(1966: 210) 
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CHAPTER 2: CHRISTMAS-EVE 
Although Browning wrote 'An Essay on Shelley' two years 
after the publication of Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day in 1850, 
these dramatic lyrics appear to preface, in poetic form some 
significant ideas postulated in the essay. In his essay Browning 
distinguishes between two kinds of objective poet or 'fashioner'. 
Concerning the creative impulse of the first kind, the question 
asked is, 'Did a soul's delight in its own extended sphere 
of vision set it, for 
power, on labour, as 
1 981 , I : 1 0 0 1 - 2 ) ? 
the gratification of an insuppressible 
other men are set on rest' (Pettigrew, 
For the second class, the question is rephrased as follows: 
'Or did a sense of duty or of love lead it to communicate its own 
sensations to mankind? Oid an irresistible sympathy with men 
compel it to bring down and suit its own provision of knowledge 
and beauty to their narrow scope' (1981, I: 1002)? 'Pie tor 
Ignotus' and 'Andrea del Sarto' seem to exemplify the corrupt 
extremes of these two types. The unknown painter has become the 
morbidly self-conscious victim of his 
extended sphere of vision', while 
'soul's delight in its own 
Andrea in his desire to 
communicate, has sacrificed originality and compelled his talent 
'to bring down and suit its own provision of knowledge and 
beauty' to the 'narrow scope' of a vulgar audience. 
'An Essay on Shelley', however, goes on to propose another 
kind of 
subjective. 
poet whose response to experience is primarily 
This is the seer, described by Browning as follows: 
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He, gifted like the objective poet with the fuller 
perception of nature and man, is impelled to embody the 
thing he perceives, not so much with reference to the 
many below as to the one above him, the supreme 
Intelligence which apprehends all things in their 
absolute truth, - an ultimate view ever aspired to, if 
but partially attained, by the poet's own soul .... Not 
with the combination of humanity in action, but with the 
primal elements of humanity he has to do; and he digs 
where he stands, - preferring to seek them in his own 
soul as the nearest reflex of the absolute Mind, 
according to the intuitions of which he desires to 
perceive and speak. . . . He is rat her a seer, 
accordingly, than a fashioner, and what he produces will 
be less a work than an effluence. 
(1981, I: 1002) 
Although Browning declined to favour either the objective or 
the subjective artist at the expense of the other, the general 
tone of his remarks strongly suggests that in his concept of the 
seer, he was proposing a higher orientation for the poetic 
impulse than would result from conforming to the demands either 
of the individual ego or society at large. It is the seer who 
emerges as the supreme type of artist, embodying in transmuted 
form the two aspects of the fashioner and merging them under the 
authority of a transcendent vision or epiphanic experience 
adequate to the opposing impulses which inhere in a double 
awareness. In other words, Browning believed that the creative 
instinct could only function at its highest potential under 
divine inspiration, and it follows then, that the poet-seer must 
acknowledge the sanction under which he writes: he will be 
'impelled to embody the thing he perceives, not so much with 
reference to the many below as to the one above him, the supreme 
Intelligence which apprehends all things in their absolute truth' 
(1981, I: 1002). 
Thus, who is better equipped to apprehend the spirit world 
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than the artist-seer endowed with special intuitions? His senses 
are more keenly responsive to beauty and his mind probes deeper 
into the laws of cause and effect, but the faculty on which 
before all others he relies is imaginative insight. 
Browning's imaginative insight in 'Christmas-Eve' appears to 
manifest a desire for a logically coherent and morally valid con-
tent which, for all its particular application, ' ... is but for 
myself I know' ('Christmas-Eve': 1187), yet involves a definite 
moral stand on the values of religion, human responsibility, and 
the need for salvation. To give expression to this ambivalent 
content, Browning draws elements of drama, satire and exposition 
into a complex narrative form of individual experiment. This 
is evident from the interaction between the particular and the 
general, subjective and objective, personal and fictional, 
strikingly reflected in the ambiguity of the basic narrative 
assumption of the poem. 
Unlike the traditional dream or vision form, in which the 
shift from reality or fantasy is clearly marked, 'Christmas-Eve' 
seems deliberately to leave both the moment and the nature of the 
experience undefined. The poem opens with apparent reality: the 
speaker leaves the slum chapel for the stormy heath, is 
emotionally shaken by the apparition of the moon and the 
moon-bow over the dark clouds, and then has his vision of Christ 
just before him on the common path. In his vision he is then 
swept up and visits Rome ('Now I see; it is no dream' (543) ) 
and Gottingen, and is finally returned to the chapel, which he 
re-enters. But the reality of the vision is challenged by the 
reality within the chapel. His neighbours show obvious signs of 
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distaste, indicating that he has slumbered and dreamed the whole 
experience. On the other hand, since he has heard the sermon and 
can judge it, how could he have been asleep? But both these 
possibilities of a dream-vision or an exercise of the imagination 
within the chapel seem incompatible with the contrast between the 
'reality' of the experience of the moon-bow and the 'vision' of 
Christ. While there is a fundamental 'double awareness' about 
the actuality of the experience, there is no doubt in 
evaluating the spiritual validity of the experience, whatever 
its position in terms of logical reality: 
For the Vision, that was true, I wist, 
True as that heaven and earth exist. 
(1244 - 45) 
This is borne out by William Clyde De Vane where he mentions that 
"In a conversation with W.G. Kingsland, Browning asserted, 
concerning Zion Chapel, that 'all the incidents are imaginary -
save the lunar rainbow: I saw that"' (1955: 199). To the 
epiphanic experience of the lunar rainbow I will return, but 
first it is important to mention that the imaginary incidents of 
the narrative, namely the Zion Chapel, St Peter's in Rome and the 
Professor in the Gottingen lecture-hall possibly owe their 
imaginative origin to a letter written by Elizabeth Barrett to 
Browning nearly a year later, in 1846, in her first confession 
of faith to him: 
Dearest, when I told you yesterday, after speaking of 
the many coloured theologies of the house, that it was 
hard to answer for what l was ... I meant that I felt 
unwillingly, for my part, to put on any of the liveries 
of the sects. The truth, as God sees it, must be 
something different from these opinions about truth -
these systems which fit different classes of men like 
their coats, and wear brown at the elbows always. I 
believe in what is divine and floats at highest, in all 
these different theologies - and because the really 
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Divine draws together souls, and tends so to a unity, I 
could pray anywhere and with all sorts of worshippers 
from the Sistine Chapel to Mr. Fox's, those kneeling and 
those standing. Wherever you go, in all religious 
societies, there is a little to revolt, and a good deal 
to bear with - but it is not otherwise in the world 
without; and, within, you are especially reminded that 
God has to be more patient than yourself after all. 
Still you go quickest there, where your sympathies are 
least ruffled and disturbed and I like, beyond 
comparison best, the simplicity of the dissenters ... 
Well - there is enough to dissent among the dissenters -
the Formula is rampant among them as among others - you 
hear things like the buzzing of flies in proof of a 
corruption - and see every now and then something divine 
set up like a post for men of irritable minds and 
passions to rub themselves against, calling it a holy 
deed - you feel moreover bigotry and ignorance pressing 
on you on all sides, till you gasp for breath like one 
strangled. But better this, even, than what is most 
beautiful in the Christian Doctrine; but the formulists, 
on the other side, stir up a dust, in which appears 
excusable not to see. When the veil of the body falls, 
then we shall look into each other's faces astonished ... 
after one glance at God's! 
(Kintner, 196~: 962) 
In his reply, Browning concurs with her ideas, clearly 
stating that the 'truth as God sees it' must differ from the 
many opinions about it. To many critics, especially those of the 
pre-1970s, the poem deals ostensibly with Browning's exploration 
of different modes of worship with his final choice being the 
Dissenters' chapel, but when one reads further in his reply to 
Miss Barrett: 
See the levity! No - this sort of levity only exists 
because of the strong conviction, I do believe! There 
seems no longer need of earnestness in assertion, or 
proof ... so it runs lightly over, like foam on top of a 
wave ... 
(Kintner, 1969: 969) 
he belies the idea of the serious consideration of denominational 
choice by his satiric burlesque of the ugly and mean congregation 
being preached to by an ignorant man in the Zion Chapel, the 
'posturings and petticoatings' (1325) of Rome and the 'exhausted 
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air-bell of the Critic' (899) in Gottingen. 
Clyde de L. Ryals (1987: 42) interprets the 'levity' that 
informs the narrative as ironic, suggesting the insoluble 
conflict between the absolute and the relative, the necessity and 
yet the impossibility of total communication. This interpretation 
I believe is valid, in that in Browning's universe any 
affirmation is only provisional. His kind of irony does not allow 
the subject to come to a stop at a single point but causes it to 
travel incessantly between the finite and the infinite, the 
bounded and the free, the signifier and the signified, in a 
balance of dialectical movement. For example, in 'Christmas-Eve' 
Browning forgoes a single, fixed, central meaning, purposefully 
leading the reader into confusion of what in the narrative is 
fact and what is fiction. This causes him/her to become caught up 
in his/her own self-consciousness, thereby implicating the. reader 
in the drama of interpretation. Thus, the artist in Browning 
plays with the subject, deconstructing the narrative order and 
determinable meaning that it pretends to offer. Underpinning 
this self-conscious artistry is the poet-seer who does believe, 
no longer needing 'earnestness in assertion or proof' 
1969: 969). 
(Kintner, 
E. Le Roy Lawson believes this ironic attitude is 
contradictory to the religious attitude. If one's faith is 
the speaker's ultimate concern, he can never enjoy an ironic 
distance from its object. Lawson says that the problem of the 
use of irony is solved when 'one sees that the poem is not 
a search for a true form of worship or a deeper understanding of 
God at all. , (1974: 68). He believes it is a didactic poem in 
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dramatic form using as his proof the lack of any real development 
of the speaker, the absence of crisis and a lack of genuine 
tension within the narrative itself. If we take the speaker to be 
Browning himself, he already knows what he believes and the 
source of that belief. He believes in Love because his heart 
tells him to. Having secured himself on a Rock of Love, he can 
view from above the religious controversy swirling beneath him. 
Another problem that has concerned critics is the levity of 
the language itself. Blackburn (1~67: 11S) finds its jog-trot 
rhythms offensive, denigrating the 'meaning' of the poem and 
disallowing adequate discussion of the infinite in language of 
such levity. But surely 'the foam on top of a wave', the 
lightness of touch, is a way of ironically emphasising depth of 
meaning through satire and understatement. Lines from 'With 
Charles Avison' reinforce the idea that meaning may exist in 
other ways besides the mind's gathering of loose facts into solid 
knowledge. There exists an intangible dimension, 'Soul', which is 
unbound by the structures of the mind and escapes from the depths 
of feeling, revealing itself in effervescent moments of 'flower 
and foam': 
So works Mind - by stress 
Of faculty, with loose facts, more or less, 
Builds up our solid knowledge: all the same, 
Underneath rolls what Mind may hide not tame, 
An element which works beyond oui guess, 
Soul, the unsounded sea - whose lift of surge, 
Spite of all superstructure, lets emerge, 
In flower and foam, Feeling from out the deeps 
Mind arrogates no mastery upon -
Distinct indisputably. 
(156 - 65) 
So again, in 'Christmas-Eve', Browning's apology through his 
speaker reminds us that: 
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Looking below light speech we utter, 
When frothy spume and frequent sputter 
Prove that the soul's depths boil in earnest! 
(1351 - 53) 
The central core of 'Christmas-Eve' is the epiphanic moment 
the speaker experiences in sections V - IX where he is a man 
alone after flinging himself from the little chapel. The 
speaker has an awed sense of Divinity pervading the entire cosmos 
and wishes to worship by himself alone, free from the irksome 
limitations of any sectarian service. He talks of the origins of 
his own religious faith and relates that even in youth he was 
aware of the power of God made manifest in His creation: 
- In youth I looked to these very skies, 
And probing their immensities, 
I found God there, his visible power; 
Yet felt in my heart, amid all its sense 
Of the power, an equal evidence 
That his love, there too, was the nobler dower. 
(279 - 84) 
This is a theme to which Browning returns again and again, 
using part or whole of what I believe is the following circle of 
ideas according to the needs of the poem. Love is the noblest 
human quality. God, if he exists, must, if he is God at all, be 
at least as capable of loving as his creatures. Therefore God is 
a God of Love. We can not only prove this intellectually, but 
establish it empirically, for God has shown us his love by 
sending Christ into the world. This we recognise as a supreme 
act of love. What is required of us in return is that we should 
also love God. When we love God or love our fellow-men we are 
ourselves closer to God. Therefore Love is the noblest human 
quality. 
Never really questioning the existence of God, the speaker 
nonetheless experiences God's qualitative and spatial distance 
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from him: 
You know what I mean: God's all, man's nought: 
But also, God, whose pleasure brought 
Men into being, stands away 
As it were a handbreadth off, to give 
Room for the newly-made to live. 
(288 - 92) 
God allows man freedom of choice by his transcendent nature; by 
his distancing himself from man. This is the counterpart of the 
idea that certainty in matters of faith would compel belief and 
that a belief so compelled would be worthless. 'Bishop 
Blougram's Apology' is perhaps one of Browning's best examples of 
how doubt can act as a corollary to faith. Although it may 
appear that in using his pragmatic philosophy of religion to 
justify the comforts of his life as a bishop, Blougram 
nevertheless warns his sceptic friend, Gigadibs, of the danger of 
judging by appearances. Blougram's beliefs are too secure - not 
too frail - to be undermined by doubt. He insists: 
What matter though I doubt at every pore, 
Head-doubts, heart-doubts, doubts at my fingers' ends~ 
Doubts in the trivial work of every day, 
Doubts at the very bases of my soul .... 
(610 - 13) 
I show you doubt, to prove that faith exists. 
(602) 
This idea is akin to another of Browning's great religious poems, 
~Saul', where David, in an impassioned speech of selfless love, 
pours out the prophecy of the coming of the greatest lover: 
... o Saul, it shall be 
A Face like my face that receives thee; a Man like to me, 
Thou shalt love and be loved by, for ever: a Hand like this 
hand 
Shall throw open the gates of new life to thee! 
(309 - 12) 
Browning of course does not use this argument as an 
40 
incitement to scepticism, as if doubt were per se good, but as a 
justification of God's ways in refusing to vouchsafe to man 
incontrovertible proofs of His existence. Man's faith on earth, 
for Browning, is a process of growing and learning from empirical 
experience, mainly observed in the natural world: 
What love can do in the leaf or stone, 
(So that to master this alone, 
This done in the stone and leaf for me, 
I must go on learning endlessly.) 
('Christmas-Eve': 343 - 46) 
The evidence in nature of God's power is important but 
secondary for Browning. His heart's feelings in effect state the 
a priori qualification of divinity. In this impulsive statement 
lies the essence of the epiphanic moment; that although the God 
he finds in nature is power, the heart's need is for love. And 
since the greatest human need is love, the highest possible 
concept for God is love. The speaker's highly charged 
understanding of love becomes the object of his worship, to which 
he attaches the name 'God'. In 'Christmas-Eve' the fusion of 
God-Christ and Love is made explicit in the following passage: 
No: love which, on earth, amid all the shows of it, 
Has ever been seen the sole good of life in it, 
The love, ever growing there, spite of the strife in it, 
Shall arise, made perfect, from death's repose of it. 
And I shall behold thee, face to face, 
0 God, and in thy light retrace 
How in all I loved here, still wast thou! 
(359 - 65) 
Love is all for him: 'the sole good of life', the means through 
which his soul will continue to grow and develop, his assurance 
of life beyond death. 
But the speaker's understanding of his epiphanic moment is 
not complete. There is a hint of pride and exclusiveness at the 
end of Section V when he asserts: 
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Oh, let men keep their ways 
Of seeking thee in a narrow shrine 
~e this my wayf And this is mine! 
(372 - 74) 
This leads on to further revelations in Section VI confronting 
the speaker directly with his overwhelming confidence in his mode 
of worship. The precise details of this scene have an important 
structural function for the epiphanic moment. The imagery of the 
moon, previously barred behind clouds, struggling to shine 
through prepares us for the emotional and symbolic implications 
of the sudden emergence of the moon and the moon-bow: 
The black cloud-barricade was riven, 
Ruined beneath her feet, and driven 
Deep in the West; while, bare and breathless, 
North and South and East lay ready 
For a glorious thing that, dauntless, deathless, 
Sprang across them and stood steady. 
'Twas a moon-rainbow, vast and perfect, 
From heaven to heaven extending, perfect 
As the mother-moon's self, full in face. 
(379 - 87) 
This epiphanic moment is consequent upon the prayer of 
praise to God for the beauty and power of nature but it is also a 
preparation for a further mystic vision. The transition is 
symbolised by the imagery of rainbow colours fusing into pure 
white light. White is of course made up of all colours; and the 
speaker can discern separately the coloured components of the 
whiteness of truth, but seldom the white light of truth itself. 
For man, truth is transcendent, always dimly veiled. This flash 
of truth gives way again to another rainbow 'mightier,/ Fainter, 
flushier and flightier, -' than the first (39~ - 400). 
Though Browning offers no explicit comment to such an 
effect, these rainbows symbolise perhaps his own theology of 
unlimited progression which contrasts with the chapel's one 
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probationary existence followed by a static heaven or hell. But 
the speaker still possesses an element of pride in his ability to 
read natural revelation; he interprets this phenomenon as a sign 
of God's blessing: 
This sight has shown me, there are thou and then, -
Me, one out of a world of men, 
Singled forth, as the chance might hap 
(405 - 7) 
and treats the phenomenon as a modern-day interpretation of the 
Transfiguration (Mark 9: 2 - 8). Like Peter, he exclaims: 
"If thou wilt, let me build to thee 
"Service-tabernacles three, 
"Where, forever in thy presence, 
"In ecstatic acquiescence, 
"Far alike from thriftless learning 
"And ignorance's undiscerning 
"I may worship and remain!" 
(413 - 19) 
His contempt for others' ignorance, with its corollary of 
pride in the exclusiveness of his own revelation, is soon 
punished by the disintegration of the rainbow: 'palely 
serpentining round/into the dark with mazy error' (428 - 29), 
teaching him (and us) that epiphanic moments are not easily read 
by man's finite perception. When heavenly revelations like 
rainbows or Biblical texts get translated into earthly terms, 
they inevitably get tainted by 'mazy error'. 
Although the speaker is 'Glutted with the glory' (422) his 
feelings of liberation quickly give way to an equally intense 
sense of being overshadowed by the towering figure of Christ. 
Even in the one moment of the moon's full splendour, at Christ's 
coming in radiance, the speaker cannot see Christ's face 'only 
the sight/ Of a sweepy garment, vast and white' (437 - 38). 
On the one hand he never looks directly at the clear white 
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light of truth because to do so would result in blindness. Truth 
itself can never be apprehended, only aspects of it perceived. 
This is why the speaker never embraces Christ directly but holds 
the hem, or is swept up in the folds of his vesture. Truth can 
never be directly embraced. As Browning says in the 'Essay on 
Shelley': 'An absolute vision is not for this world, but we are 
permitted a continual approximation to it ... ' (Pettigrew, 1981, 
I: 1005). He receives no full revelation of all metaphysical 
truth, but what is revealed is Christ as the full embodiment of 
love, the highest example for human behaviour. 
On the other hand, when the speaker is unable to see the 
figure's face, averted perhaps in disapproval, he remembers the 
words in the New Testament which seem a direct rebuke to any man 
who would worship alone, or at least to any who scorn those who 
worship together: 
"I remember, he did say 
"Doubtless that, to this world's end, 
"Where two or three should meet and pray, 
"He would be in the midst, their friend; 
"Certainly he was there with them!" 
(443 - 47) 
and he recognises his pride, pleading with the figure not to 
abandon him for choosing to worship alone: 
"Therefore thou must not turn from me 
"As I had chosen the other part! 
"Folly and pride o'ercame my heart. 
(462 - 64) 
The figure moves away, as though to express displeasure and the 
speaker calls after, in penitence and prayer, acknowledging his 
own 'Folly and pride'. Christ then turns back: 
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The whole face turned upon me full. 
And I spread myself beneath it, 
As when the bleacher spreads, to seethe it 
In the cleansing sun, his wool, -
Steeps in the flood of noontide whiteness 
Some defiled, discoloured web -
So lay I, saturate with brightness. 
And when the flood appeared to ebb, 
Lo, I was walking, light and swift .... 
(487 - 95) 
Here again, the speaker is unable to confront the figure of 
Christ face to face: the pure white light of truth. Browning 
feels that he cannot endure the central incandescence of 
revelation, but he is able to feel and experience the saturating 
brightness of Christ's love. According to him, unlike 
Christopher Smart (1722 - 71), the English poet whom he much 
admired, no other poet between Milton and Keats, including 
himself, has been able to pierce the screen between the epiphanic 
experience and the recording of it in language. He recognises 
Smart's gift to confront the pure 'fire-flame' ('With 
Christopher Smart': 12~) of truth while he acknowledges that 
'with life be my concern-' (122). In other words, Browning is 
content to experience, like most men, the revelation of truth to 
man while on earth through love. And this, for him, is the 
essence of the epiphanic moment. I believe that it is not as 
Duckworth (1966: 199) suggests, that Browning desired the white 
light of truth yet was terrified by it, but that only by rarest 
chance is naked truth revealed to some men . 
. .. and whoso saw for once could tell 
Us others of her majesty and might 
In large, her loveliness infinite 
In little .... 
('With Christopher Smart': 142 - 45} 
But the poet can speak confidently of the divinity of love 
because the evidence of the inner man supports this belief. 
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Further on in 'Christmas-Eve' he maintains that the one reliable 
testimony to truth comes from within: 
Take all in a word: the truth in God's breast 
Lies trace for trace upon ours impressed .... 
(1018 - 1~) 
A man can be certain that he knows more in his conscience 
Of what right is, than arrives at birth 
In the best man's acts that we bow before: 
This last knows better - true, but my fact is, 
'T is one thing to know, and another to practise. 
And thence I conclude that the real God-function 
Is to furnish a motive and injunction 
For practising what we know already. 
(1036 - 42) 
The speaker then finds that motive and injunction in Christ and 
that the truth of the conscience is identical with the truth of 
God. Ironically it is God's (and not man's) true function to 
serve man's moral needs. Truth, he realises, is not something 
one knows; it is something one does, and for Browning love is a 
concrete action, not an abstract principle. Without an 
unobstructed vision of truth, man can still act upon what he 
knows: the limited truth that he does possess. He knows that he 
can love, therefore he must. 
The denouement of the epiphanic moment occurs when, clinging 
to Christ's garments, the speaker is carried to Rome where he 
witnesses the Christmas service in St Peter's, and then the 
Christmas eve lecture at Gottingen. Through these two visions 
the speaker realises that for him the Roman Catholic religion 
provides for the love that is the central core of religion, but 
denigrates the intellect, while German rationalism elevates the 
intellect and ignores the essential human need for a super-
rational and loving relationship with the Divine. Through 
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exposure to these views, the speaker has learnt in his own 
experience to balance the claims of heart and head, using his 
intellect to evaluate and his feelings to emphasise. He has also 
learnt that the position of detached observer is yet more 
dangerous to the self than any imbalance of commitment. Thus in 
essence these experiences have led him to the realisation of 
man's need to express his religious feeling which essentially 
reflects both love and knowledge in an act of corporate worship, 
however imperfect its nature. 
For I, a man, with men am linked 
And not a brute with brutes; no gain 
That I experience, must remain 
Unshared. 
(1176 - 79) 
Because all forms of worship are but vessels and of value only as 
they carry the living water, and because the Dissenter tradition 
for him places the least emphasis on the vessel, the speaker 
chooses 'in ignorance and weakness' (1301) to worship with the 
Dissenters: 
For the preacher's merit or demerit, 
It were to be wished the flaws were fewer 
In the earthen vessel, holding treasure 
Which lies as safe in a golden ewer; 
But the main thing is, does it hold good measure? 
Heaven soon sets right all other matters!· 
(1311 - 16) 
But the speaker's choice of Zion Chapel is secondary in 
significance to the sense of elation based upon the total 
experience clarified by the vision of Rome and Gottingen. 
And this elation Browning does not present as the final and only 
armour for all men. This is the individual truth the poet 
himself arrived at through his own experiences, realistic and 
imaginary: 
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- I cannot bid 
The world admit he stooped to heal 
My soul, as if in a thunder-peal 
Where one heard noise, and one saw flame, 
I only knew he named my name .... 
(1206 - 10) 
Even though the particular choice may have relevance only to the 
particular man and his experience, the fact of his committed 
choice has a wider moral implication. The whole tenor of the 
poem expresses ~rowning's didactic imperative of the urgency of 
each man's individual choice and commitment. 
Critics such as Peterson (1986: 363 - 80) and Ryals (1987: 
39 - 44) have taken the ending of the poem to be ironic and 
suffused with ambiguity. Was the speaker caught up in some 
genuine visionary experience or did he merely fall asleep? Can 
we trust him either as a conveyer of interpretation or as an 
interpreter himself? What they fail to recognise is that 
'Christmas-Eve' is presented as a dramatically conceived 
experience carrying its full meaning in the intensity of the 
epiphanic moment rather than in any logically coherent body 
of thought. The ambivalences lie not in the sincerity (or not) 
of the poet's choice of the Zion Chapel, for, when he says, 'i 
choose here!' (1341) he has moved from the narrative past to the 
writing present, underlining again the need for man to confront 
personally and individually his own religious beliefs. The 
multivalent meanings of the epiphanic moment are Browning's own 
religious questionings of his essentially deep-rooted faith, 
contained within an artistic construct. 
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CHAPTER 3: EASTER-DAY 
Before focusing on the epiphanic moment in "Easter-Day' it is 
important to comment on the dramatic lyric mode which Browning 
employs in this companion poem to "Christmas-Eve'. The first 
twelve sections are cast in the form of a dialogue between two 
speakers, neither of whom, as we see from Section IV, is the same 
as the speaker in "Christmas-Eve'. 
poem confirms and develops the 
approach to Christianity which 
(1981: 133). 
But as Harty comments, "This 
personal individualistic 
concluded "Christmas-Eve'' 
The first speaker, whose monologue the poem is, finds it 
difficult to be a Christian while the second speaker puts 
forward, for the most part, the arguments for not allowing one's 
faith to become a burden - "Here I live I In trusting ease' (325 
- 26). It is difficult to define Browning's attitude to both 
speakers as both express views with which Browning has sympathy. 
Unlike Mrs Sutherland Orr (1887: 184) who labelled the two 
characters as the "sceptic' and 'the man of faith', I believe 
that Drew's (1970: 206 - 7) idea of the speaker representing 
one side of Browning's mind, while the Easy Christian the other, 
is closer to defining Browning's continual debate and struggle 
with his faith. As with 'Christmas-Eve', 'Easter-Day' too reveals 
Browning's abhorrence of passivity and complacent certainty in 
matters of faith, considering the true substance of faith to be a 
dynamic process, rather than a conclusion finally won and held. 
In a letter written to Elizabeth, Browning explained that 
one must make one~s choice amid uncertainty, 'For all one's life 
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is some form of religion and all our action some belief' 
(Kintner, 196g:213). Belief therefore should be judged not by its 
proximity to orthodoxy, but by a personal effort expended in 
believing. This insistence on the personal nature of religious 
experience leads to an examination in 'Easter-Day' of the vital 
question, 'What does Christianity mean to me?' or similarly, 'How 
am l to become a Christian?' 
We can observe in these questions strains of Kierkegaardian 
theology: the emphasis on a personal working out of one's faith 
based on empirical experience. Even stylistically, Browning's 
way of proceeding by argument and debate is very much in the 
manner of the Danish theologian. Browning's existential posture 
is therefore to be reflected in his belief that man confronts God 
personally and the only reliable information upon which religious 
decisions can be made is personal. Ultimate truth cannot be 
pressed into verbal propositions or safeguarded by hallowed 
institutions. tingsbury Badger notes that: 
Because Browning found ample evidence of religion in 
human experience, he did not need either the external 
evidence of miracles or the facts of history to 
strengthen his faith. 
(1966: 91) 
Browning's emphasis on the 'evidence of religion in human 
experience' may explain his later theory of Christianity as a 
dynamic and evolving faith in which mankind grows in love for God 
and his fellow creatures. It is then not surprising that his 
favourite Gospel was John, the one that records only six miracles 
and is less concerned with the historical sequence of events than 
with showing Christ's divinity and God as a God of love. 'A 
Death in the Desert' examines, among other issues, Browning's 
50 
fear that historical 'fact' might trample on spiritual truth and 
the empirical knowledge of Christianity evidenced in love. 
Victorian man saw himself as the master of his own destiny and 
even of love, as the following lines declare: 
But when, beholding that love everywhere, 
He reasons, "Since such love is everywhere, 
And since ourselves can love and would be loved, 
We ourselves make the love, and Christ was not, ... " 
(504 - 7) 
William O. Raymond puts it succinctly when he postulates: 
... that Browning considers the historical evidences of 
Christianity only as a corollary to what may be called 
the Gospel of the eternal Christ, or less theologically, 
the unceasing revelation of the infinite love and 
self-sacrifice of a divine being in lives transfigured 
by his presence. 
(1929: 608 - 9) 
The speaker too in 'Easter-Day', wishes to find proof in 
historical fact, looking for comfort in 'some mummy-scrap' (178) 
declaring Moses lives, or explaining Jonah's whale, but no - 'the 
human heart's best' (185). The final authority in religious 
choice is the chooser. In his uncertainty and loneliness, 
Browning's man must choose to believe in God, desiring to satisfy 
Him, and he admits that it is belief and not knowledge which 
motivates him. 
But this belief is not finite and unquestioning; it is not 
without its difficulties. The second speaker claims that 
Christian practice would be easy if Christian doctrines were only 
certain: 
Could I believe once thoroughly, 
The rest were simple. What? Am I 
An idiot, do you think, - a beast? 
Prove to me, only that the least 
Command of God is God's indeed, 
And what injunction shall I need 
To pay obedience? 
(31 - 7) 
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The first speaker answers him by contending that certainty of 
God's will which is not to be had while in the human condition 
would make the Christian life inevitable and without value when 
we are not confronted with the choice between good and evil. It 
is interesting to note that in his last years, Browning continued 
to explore in greater depth, the problem of good and evil. In 'La 
Saisiaz', which will be analysed in the following chapter, this 
debate forms the main thrust of the poem. 
Could he acquit us or condemn 
For holding what no hand can loose, 
Rejecting when we can't but choose? 
(62 - 4) 
But even in man's free choice, he cannot always rely on his 
intuitions as unfailing guides to conduct. If it were so, the 
test of life would be destroyed. The first speaker corroborates 
this idea: 
You must mix some uncertainty 
With faith, if you would have faith be. 
Why, what but faith, do we abhor 
And idolize each other for -
Faith in our evil or our good, 
Which is or is not understood 
Aright by those we love or those 
We hate, thence called our friends or foes? 
(71 - 8) 
Not even man's experiences may be relied on as a guide. The 
moral choice of yesterday which fitted the exigencies of the 
moment so well, may not be blindly relied on to answer the needs 
of tomorrow. Each test is new and fresh and individual and the 
ambivalence of our response must be directed by the daily 
immanence of God in our lives. 
In Section VI the second speaker is forced to agree that 
faith cannot be founded on certainty 'A scientific faith's 
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absurd' (124) but pleads for at least probability: 'the chance 
must lie/ Clear on one side' (128 - 9). The first speaker replies 
that there are many probabilities which affirm the Christian 
faith and one will find 'evidence enough' (172). 
'T is found, 
No doubt: as is your sort of mind, 
So is your sort of search: you'll find 
What you desire .... 
(172 - 5) 
But once all these 'proofs' are found 'what remains?' (198). 
Immediately, the second speaker responds fervently with 
'Renounce the world!' (199). This, suggests the first, is easier 
said than done. 
- Ah, were it done 
By merely cutting one by one 
Your limbs off, with your wise head last, 
How easy were it! - how soon past, 
If once in the believing mood! 
(199 - 203) 
To cut oneself off from the world is an easy evasion of probation 
done in the heat of momentary fervour. Browning believed this 
unthinking submission of will and intellect as contrary to true 
faith. His letter of 1845 to Elizabeth echoes these sentiments: 
Chop off your legs, you will never go astray, - stifle 
your reason altogether and you will find it difficult to 
reason ill; "it is hard to make such sacrifices!" - Not 
so hard as to lose the reward or incur the penalty of an 
Eternity to come, "hard to effect them, then, and go 
through with them" - not hard, when the leg is to be cut 
off - that it is rather harder to keep it quiet on a 
stool, I know very well. 
(Kintner, 1969: Zf~) 
The second speaker, because he fundamentally refuses to confront 
the problems of belief that his friend poses, misunderstands the 
challenge 'cut off your limbs' and accuses him of looking for 
difficulties where none exist: 
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More pettishly we try and cull 
Briers, thistles, from our private plot, 
To mar God's ground where thorns are not! 
(224 - 26) 
the debate now becomes somewhat confused which shows how 
Browning felt torn between the views of the doubter and the one 
who fervently wishes to accept unquestioningly: 
Do you say this, or I? - Oh you! 
Then, what, my friend? - (thus I pursue 
Our parley) .... 
(227 - 29) 
The first speaker then poses a trenchant question. He asks 
whether belief in the stupendous drama of Christ's Incarnation 
was merely played out to heighten our joys and make our sorrows 
easier to bear. Surely then, faith would simply be utilitarian in 
function. In other words he is demanding more of faith than this. 
He illustrates his contention with an example of a martyr, who 
having endured many trials, experiences a personal confrontation 
with Christ: 
But at the Close a Hand came through 
The fire above my head, and drew 
My soul to Christ, whom now I see. 
(283 - 85) 
This revelation is enviable and far above the simplistic 
renunciation of the world for the sake of an intellectual 
acceptance of a faith which happens to be beyond our knowledge. 
Is this not then self-delusion? 
lines of the poem: 
- how hard it is 
To be a Christian! 
(320 - 21) 
And he reiterates the opening 
Clearly, in Section XI, the second speaker feels disarmed and 
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rebukes his friend for unsettling his beliefs of 'trusting ease' 
(326) and 
... causing me to lose what most 
Yourself would mourn for had you lost! 
(327 - 28) 
But as the first speaker points out, this faith is illusory and 
one based on blind hope and a death-wish brought about by a need 
to renounce the world. Thus the dialogue ends and both doubter 
and easy believer admit that proof of God's designs are 
inaccessible. Absolute knowledge of God cannot be ours. Far 
closer than our duty to believe is our doubt: 
I wish indeed 'God's kingdom come 
The day when I shall see appear 
His bidding, as my duty, clear 
From doubt! (458 - 61) 
The dialectic has led nowhere and the believer can only appeal 
finally to personal experience. In the remainder of the poem the 
first speaker works out a definition by which he can understand 
faith to be a conclusive and definite choice, yet avoid seeing 
such conclusiveness as a condition of stagnant passivity. The 
speaker recounts a remarkable vision in which he confronted 
Christ three years earlier. On a walk while meditating about life 
after death, he asks himself: 
How were my case, now, did I fall 
Dead here, this minute - should I lie 
Faithful or faithless? 
(396 - 98) 
This is the question the speaker of 'Easter-Day' sets himself to 
answer. On the night before Easter, he asks himself what meaning 
for him personally lies in 'That History, that Faith' (388). His 
answer comes in an epiphanic moment: a vision of Judgement, a 
magnificent rending of the heavens which leaves 
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... exposed the utmost walls 
Of time, about to tumble in 
And end the world. 
(544 - 46) 
It is an existential moment for him. He is alone before the 
final Judge, choosing his destiny. 
There, stood I, found and fixed, I knew, 
Choosing the world. The choice was made; 
And naked and disguiseless stayed, 
And unevadable, the fact. 
(552 - 55) 
Having chosen the world rather than God is the speaker's attempt 
to excuse himself on the grounds that the world, being God's 
creation, was too beautiful to renounce. 
solemn voice saying: 
Life is done, 
Time ends, Eternity's begun, 
And thou art judged for evermore. 
(594 - 96) 
It is met only by a 
The debate, which once again Browning uses, this time between the 
speaker and God himself, provides the explanation of' this stern 
decree in the following eleven sections. It is evidence of 
Browning's determination through the personal epiphanic moment to 
view Christianity not from the outside, but as an empirical basis 
for his way of life. It is a confrontation with Christ himself, 
not as an historical personage, but as an epiphany of majestic 
splendour. He is Browning's creation. In 'Christmas-Eve', 
although he appears 'with human air' (432), the speaker sees 'the 
back of him, no more' (434). He recognises the hem of his 'vast 
and white' (438) garment, and he is terrified. This awesome 
Christ is called 'the love of God' (459). In 'Easter-Day', Christ 
appears as Judge, meeting the speaker in his vision of death. 
The description is more vivid than in 'Christmas-Eve' but Christ 
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is no more real. 
He stood there. Like the smoke 
Pillared o'er Sodom, when day broke, -
I saw Him. One magnific pall 
Mantled in massive fold and fall 
His head, and coiled in snaky swathes 
About His feet: night's black, that bathes 
All else, broke, grizzled with despair, 
Against the soul of blackness there. 
(640 - 47) 
The awfulness of the moment reduces the speaker to 'a mass,/ No 
man now' (654). So the voice of God speaks: 
This world, 
This finite life, thou hast preferred, 
In disbelief of God's plain word, 
To Heaven and to infinity. 
Here the probation was for thee, 
To show thy soul the earthly mixed 
With heavenly, it must choose betwixt ... 
Thy choice was earth: thou didst attest 
'T was fitter spirit should subserve 
The flesh, than flesh refine to nerve 
Beneath the spirit's play. 
(667 - 73, 679 - 82) 
As the speaker has chosen earth, then all the earth shall be his 
and he foolishly rejoices at the gifts of the world's 'Vast 
Exhaustless beauty.' (745). But the Christ figure who stands 
before him tells him that as he has deliberately chosen the 
world, the finite life, in opposition to God, heaven is forever 
denied him. 
Thou art shut 
Out of the heaven of spirit; glut 
Thy sense upon the world: 't is thine 
For ever - take it! 
(696 - 99) 
Realising that nature, which divorced from any supernatural 
order offers no evidence of life's plan or direction, the speaker 
struggles with his decision as he remonstrates with God about the 
endless wonder and beauty of creation. Later, in 'Caliban upon 
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Setebos' (1864) Browning was, in darker tone, to set out in more 
detail his rejection of natural theology, exposing the 
imperfections of a 'natural' religion and its God of mere power. 
He believed that it is not possible to arrive at a proof of the 
nature of God by reasoning from His universe. Cali ban, •the 
natural man', never experiences the moment of revelation, of 
insight, so necessary for spiritual fulfilment, in spite of being 
intimately part of God's natural creation. Thus, in 'Easter-Day' 
the 'austere voice' (704) rebukes him explaining that the earth 
is merely the antechamber to Heaven. A wise man would know how 
much Heaven must exceed the earth in beauty. For man, 
All partial beauty was a pledge 
Of beauty in its plenitude: 
But since the pledge sufficed thy mood, 
Retain it! plenitude, be theirs 
Who looked above! 
(769 - 73) 
Art, to which the speaker turns next, can record man's 
hopes, struggles and limitations, but it cannot serve as a basis 
for faith. Great works of sculpture and painting, even though 
transcending Nature are at best imperfect reflections of the 
ideal beauty in the artist's mind, as this world is an imperfect 
reflection of heaven. Using the metaphor of a lizard's hole in a 
rock which can be easily shattered to explain the insufficiency 
and limitations of the world 'To house man's soul, man's need 
fu 1fi1 ' ( 8 4 5 ) , the speaker realizes how his choice is limited 
and inadequate. This argument from the imperfections of earth 
to the perfection of Heaven is an example of Browning's belief in 
treating the world as a time of learning, probation and 
development. 
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Similarly the concept of Art as transcending Nature and as 
offering a glimpse of the perfections to come is evidence for a 
future life in which the artist's shadowing forth of the ideal 
shall become reality. The artist is therefore a tool in the 
hands of the Creator and apprehends, although at many removes, a 
complete world. Thus he shares and makes manifest some of God's 
power. 
Realizing that he is being consistently rebutted in his 
reliance on the natural world and Art as revelations of God's 
love, the speaker despairingly then proclaims 'Mind is best' 
(874), testing reason as a foundation for faith. But the mind 
depends on unreliable physical senses and thus is itself 
inadequate. All operations of the intellect are earthbound and 
the question 'Whereto does knowledge serve!' (897) is sufficient 
to show the limitations of mental activity. 
Even poetry, which offers a means of transcending the human 
condition is rejected by God at the end of Section XXVIII. The 
poet can only offer fleeting glimpses of the world of the spirit 
because no man can experience it for long: 
else were permanent 
Heaven on the earth; its gleams were meant 
To sting with hunger for full light .... 
(919 - 21) 
These fleeting glimpses are an oblique vision of the spirit world 
of reality and again are inadequate reflections of truth. Finally 
realizing the emptiness of the strictly physical and temporal, 
the speaker cries out: 
Behold, my spirit bleeds, 
Catches no more at broken reeds, -
But lilies flower those reeds above: 
I let the world go, and take love! 
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Love survives in me, albeit those 
I love be henceforth masks and shows, 
Not living men and women: still 
I mind how love repaired all ill, 
Cured wrong, soothed grief, made earth amends 
With parents, brothers, children, friends! 
I pray, -
Leave to love, only! 
(931 - 40, 950 - 51} 
This is the speaker's internalizing of the epiphanic moment, 
the moment to which God has been compelling him and he realizes 
that all that is left to him is love. And yet the revelation is 
not clear. He says he will try to find a woman with whom he can 
live in affection. To this he receives a scornful reply from God 
that man's love is a poor reflection of God's love which has 
always been manifest in His dying for him. God asks how anyone 
could reject that event on the grounds that there was 'Too much 
love!' (979) in it. Thus the central moment becomes clear for 
the speaker and one which compelled Browning the most: the 
Incarnation as the supreme act of God's love. 
Only in Love, in reaching outward and being touched by both 
the human and the divine can life's meaning be found. What 
begins as existential anguish, with a solitary figure searching 
for order in chaos, leads not to a sense of absurdity and 
meaninglessness in his personal universe - but to an assertion of 
himself and a commitment to cosmic and personal love: 
- Now take lover Well betide 
Thy tardy conscience! Haste to take 
The show of love for the name's sake, 
Remembering every moment Who, 
Beside creating thee unto 
These ends, and these for thee, was said 
To undergo death in thy stead 
In flesh like thine: so ran the tale. 
What doubt in thee could countervail 
Belief in it? Upon the ground 
'That in the story had been found 
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Too much love! How could God love so?' 
He who in all his works below, 
Adapted to the needs of man, 
Made love the basis of the plan, -
Did love, as was demonstrated: 
While man, who was so fit instead 
To hate, as every day gave proof, -
Man thought man, for his kind's behoof, 
Both could and did invent that scheme 
Of perfect love .... 
(968 - 88) 
The clarity, depth and meaning of the vision is too much to bear 
and the speaker cowers deprecatingly, crying, ' ... leave me not 
tied/To this despair' (995-6). The threat of non-being and its 
corresponding anguish, dread and isolation are real but his 
choice of love represents his determination to affirm meaning in 
life and his universe. Even following his choice there is no 
real assurance except to exercise 'the courage to be', subsuming 
doubt within his belief because conclusive proof is missing. 
'The courage to be' is a technical term used by theologian Paul 
Tillich, and described by him in the following terms: 
It takes seriously the radical doubt experienced by many 
people. It gives one the courage of self-affirmation 
even in the extreme state of radical doubt. In such a 
state the God of both religious and theological language 
disappears. But something remains, namely, the 
seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within 
meaninglessness is affirmed. The source of this 
affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, of 
certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional 
theism, but the "God above God", the power of being, 
which works through those who have no name for it, not 
even the name God. 
(1968, Z: 13 - 14) 
Thus, all Browning can do is to ask that he shall at least be 
spared the knowledge that all is lost in a life of uncertainty 
and struggle: 
Only let me go on, go on, 
Still hoping ever and anon 
To reach one eve the Better Land! 
(1001 - 3) 
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With this cry of angst the unmoving Judge is transformed into a 
form of archetypal Love, the incarnation - not of God - but of 
Browning's mature and complex conception of Love. 
Then did the form expand, expand -
I knew Him through the dread disguise 
As the whole God within His eyes 
Embraced me. 
(1004 - 7) 
The speaker comes to the conclusion that the only worthy evidence 
for faith is Love not human love, which like Art is only a 
reflection, though in itself a valuable guide but Divine Love 
such as God showed in sending His son to live and die among men. 
One could profitably compare the experience of love's 
embrace here with Saulrs embracing of David in the poem 'Saul'. 
The blending of human love through fleshly contact is infused 
with divine illumination as David wishes passionately for the 
redemption of the soul of King Saul: 
... he spoke not, but slow 
Lifted up the hand slack at his side, till he laid it with 
care 
Soft and grave, but in mild settled will, on my brow thro' 
my hair 
The large fingers were pushed, and he bent back my head, 
with kind power -
All my face back, intent to peruse it, as men do a flower. 
Thus held he me there with his great eyes that scrutinized 
mine -
And oh, all my heart how it loved him! .... 
(226 - 32) 
After the 'insubstantial pageant' has faded the speaker in 
'Easter-Day' finds himself back on the 'grey plain' (1008) 
uncertain of his moment of confrontation with Christ: 'Was this a 
vision? False or true?' (1010). His final words suggest the 
ambiguity of the epiphanic moment and the ambivalence of his 
response. So he goes on in doubt, but 
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happy that I can 
Be crossed and thwarted as a man, 
Not left in God's contempt apart, 
With ghastly smooth life, dead at heart, 
Tame in earth's paddock as her prize. 
(1021 - 25) 
This, paradoxically, is an affirmation of his awareness of the 
world's temptations and although he cannot bring himself to 
renounce the world totally, he has been moved to a sharper 
realisation that its goods are imperfect goods, valuable only as 
they enable the soul to mount even higher on the ladder of love. 
The epiphanic moment is not final, but it has been an instance of 
clarity in his struggle within the human condition. The 
reiteration of the words of the poem's opening: 
and I find it hard 
To be a Christian, as I said? 
(1030 - 31) 
show that Browning is not wholly secure in the knowledge that it 
will be sufficient on Judgement Day to plead that though unable 
to renounce the world, he had ever aspired beyond it. In other 
words, the Judgement has already been made, but retains a sense 
of continuity in that the individual's response to that judgement 
is what will finally decide his fate. In this he continues to 
follow the Johannine eschatology: 
He who believes in him is not condemned; he who does not 
believe is condemned already, ... And this is the 
judgement, that the light has come into the world, and 
men loved darkness rather than light .... 
(John 3: 18 - 19) 
Because of this he does not despair when he recalls Christ's 
sacrificial act and the infinite mercy of God which he accepts 
is beyond man's temporal knowledge: 
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But Easter-Day breaks! But 
Christ rises! Mercy every way 
Is infinite, - and who can say? 
(1038 - 40) 
The speaker's words here reflect the fact that although judgement 
has been passed, he is required to make a continual response to 
that judgement. So despite his apparent triumphalism and 
certainty of the Resurrection, he nevertheless ends on a note of 
doubt: ' - and who can say?' (1040), emphasizing the fact that 
this response, which we might call faith, is one which must 
continually answer new questions. 
'Christmas-Eve' prepared for Browning's future development 
of religious themes, and in 'Easter-Day~, as De Vane says, he 
'built his conception of a modern Christian, discussing this time 
not man's relation to the various creeds (as in 'Christmas-Eve') 
but his direct relation to Christ who lived and died on earth for 
him and rose from the dead on Easter day' (1955: 202). 
Typical of his thought both poems analyse, through a process 
of doubt, the obstacles to belief instead of rendering their 
substance in doctrinal form. They both lay far more stress upon 
the epiphanic moment of choice than upon the church or the creed 
being chosen. Thus arises a peculiar coincidence of the eternal 
with the opportune, the arbitrary with the redemptive. These 
contraries meet at occasions of ethical crisis and seem to 
constitute a Browningesque mythology of the 'good moment'. The 
characters of these two poems, like those in his other dramatic 
monologues become most themselves at the 'good moment', when 
they make up their own minds in despite of sufficient evidence 
and extenuating scruples, 'Life's business being just the 
terrible choice' (The Ring and the Book: 1237). The encounter of 
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an existential ultimatism and the response ultimately constitute 
a person's world. 
Tucker detects in Browning 
The tension between dramatic sympathy and dramatic irony 
that is induced by a reading of his monologues 
corresponds to the thematic contrasts they dramatise: 
between artistic realism and idealism; between 
subjectivity and objectivity as philosophical modes; 
between theological immanence and transcendence; between 
ethical commitment to a penultimate meaning, for the 
time being, an intuition of an eternally ulterior 
reality always yet to be grasped. 
(1987:212) 
So for Browning, reality - the state of things as they are -
could never be ultimate. The speaker in 'Easter-Day' who makes 
no choice and is content to be swept along by the values of this 
world, condemns himself. To make a choice - any choice - would 
appear for Browning more important than whether that choice were 
right or wrong. His ambivalent stance, for example, is 
highlighted in both 'The Flight of the Duchess' and 'The Statue 
and the Bust'. In the former, he endorses the Duchess's decision 
to leave her husband and take a gypsy lover, while in the 
latter, he criticises the protagonist's inability to make either 
the 'right' or the 'wrong' decision. Thus without choice the 
individual is unable to experience an epiphany of light or 
conversely, one of darkness, and consequently loses what meant 
most to the poet: the future as the locus of ultimate meaning and 
value, and the desire for continuing transformation while in this 
world. 
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CHAPTER 4: LA SAISIAZ 
Browning's final period of writing in the years 1870 - 1889 could 
be labelled expository and includes all the work after The Ring 
and the Book (1868). In these poems, the poet moves out from 
behind the dramatic mask and speaks directly, often imposing his 
ideas upon his poems, no longer struggling to maintain dramatic 
tension. His chief concern is with the exposition and 
exploitation of an abstract idea. The energy of these 
speculative poems comes from the interest of the idea; the 
articulation of the argument is the structure. 
In 'Fifine at the Fair' (1872) and 'La Saisiaz' (1878), 
Browning undertakes a methodical scrutiny of the bases of man's 
moral life. In the earlier poem, his speaker, 'one who loves and 
grasps and spoils and speculates' (1555), offers a ruthlessly 
reductionist analysis of human values; in the second he reverses 
the process and attempts to construct a model of man's moral 
nature by the controlled addition of postulates judged to be 
essential. It is when Browning is moving in this territory that 
we notice the confirmation of sceptical premise and optimistic 
conclusion. The last words of 'Easter-Day' - 'who can say?' 
(1040) aptly convey his speculative and inquiring approach to 
religion and show the inadequacy of regarding him as dedicated to 
a rigid conformity to an optimistic faith. By 1864 Browning had 
certainly modified his early rejection of the Higher Criticism so 
apparent in 'Christmas-Eve' with his publication of 'A Death in 
the Desert' and later with poems dealing with the transmission of 
supposedly historical fact, such as 'Development' (1888 or 1889) 
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and 'Imperante Augusto ~atus Est - ' (1888 or 1889). I believe 
that William o. Raymond is correct in stating that because 
Browning made a distinction between love and reason, feeling and 
intelligence, which led him to adopt a sceptical view of human 
knowledge, he came to regard the Incarnation and crucifixion as 
historical facts, incapable of proof or disproof. As Raymond 
says~ 
his faith in the intuitive testimony of the heart to 
the existence of a loving, self-sacrificing God, working 
with redemptive and transfiguring power in human 
ex:perience, never wavers .... It is the function of the 
heart to "melt the freezing reason's colder part." His 
gnosticism is primarily emotional. 
(1929: 607 - 8) 
Always obsessed by the thought of the mystery of human life and 
the profound mystery of true religion, Browning's heterodoxy 
would not allow him to have solved the ultimate problems; nor 
would he agree that any religious sect possesses the complete 
answer. He could only offer declarations of what faith he had 
himself attained to, mute before the mystery no man should dare 
to presume to understand. 
It was symptomatic of his relentless honesty that he should 
write a poem of 'honest doubt' when confronted with the problem 
of sudden death. This sudden death of a friend partly prompted 
the conception of 'La Saisiaz' which was probably written between 
September 14 and November 9, 1878. Browning at 66 and a widower 
for 17 years had as his constant companion in his latter years a 
Miss Ann Egerton Smith. In 1877 he, his sister and Miss Smith 
had taken a chalet 'La Saisiaz' (Savoyard for 'The sun'), 
situated near Mt Saleve, some five miles south-west of Geneva. 
Browning and Miss Smith had planned an ascent of the mountain on 
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September 14 which was prevented by her sudden death from heart 
disease. 
Two days later she was buried in the nearby village of 
Collonge. The suddenness of this unexpected event led Browning to 
the consideration of the abode of his friend's soul, now that her 
body was buried in Collonge. This moment of intensest experience 
of the break up of the flesh in death, prompted the epiphanic 
moments evident in 'La Saisiaz'. 
Browning may also have had in mind the debate Miss Smith and 
he had been following in the Nineteenth Century, based on a 
series of articles called, 'A Modern Symposium upon the Soul and 
Future Life'. De Vane (1955: 422) believes that the poem may be 
said to be Browning's contribution to the debate and that his 
arguments, like those of the contributors to the symposium, 
deliberately excluded the authority of Christian revelation by 
attempting to evolve an advanced form of religious belief fro~ 
first principles: 
I shall pick a clod and throw, - cry "Such the 
sight and such the sound! 
What though I nor see nor hear them? Others 
do, the proofs abound!" 
Can I make my eye an eagle's, sharpen ear to 
recognize 
Sound o~er league and league of silence? Can I 
know, who but surmise? 
If I dared no self-deception when, a week since, 
I and you 
Walked and talked along the grass-path, passing 
lightly in review 
What seemed hits and what seemed misses in a 
certain fence-play, - strife 
Sundry minds of mark engaged in "On the Soul 
and Future Life," .... 
(157 - 64) 
Thus the combination of deep shock and the fresh memories of 
lively discussion with Miss Smith caused what Priestly calls 
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'Browning's katharsis, his successful emergence from shock' 
(1966:242). The poem expresses, then, Browning's deepest emotions 
about life beyond the grave and his reasons for belief in 
immortality. 
Although the subject of the poem is immortality, this theme 
cannot be considered apart from Browning's other religious 
convictions mentioned in previous chapters: the essential nature 
of man who subjects all facts and choices to personal judgements; 
the limitations of ·man who escapes bondage to himself through 
projection into other personalities and times; the necessity of a 
future which calls man into himself, drawing him purposefully 
through his probationary period into his fulfilment; and the 
reality of a God who informs and presides over all. 
Unlike in 'Christmas-Eve' and 'Easter-Day' where the 
epiphanic experience emerges out of a visionary revelation, in 
'La Saisiaz' Browning comes to it through a process of inner 
debate, putting forward all the arguments against immortality in 
order to refute them. The climax of the epiphanic moment is 
two-fold, recorded first in the lines: 
Why, he at least believed in soul, was 
very sure of God 
(604) 
and then again recollected in tranquillity later when he 
completed the poem 'in London's mid-November!F (606): 
Least part this: then what the whole? 
(618) 
Later in this chapter I will explain how this double epiphany is 
achieved after Browning's rigorous debate on the subject. 
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Although it is true that he wrote in the short prologue to 
the poem: 
Soul that canst soar! 
Body may slumber: 
Body shall cumber 
Soul-flight no more ... 
(13 - 6} 
postulating the idea that the poet was convinced of the 
immortality of the soul, it was not Browning's way to accept the 
soul's flight without wrestling long and steadfastly with the 
problem of the real relationship of body and soul and exactly 
what the intrusion of death meant to that relationship. 
Furthermore, the circumstances of the poem's conception make it 
more than just an intellectual exercise. 
In the first part of the poem (1 - 216}, Browning tenderly 
addresses Miss Smith, evoking the pleasures of their holidays 
together and the beauty of the countryside around Mt Saleve. The 
first words of the opening: 
Dared and done: at last I stand upon the summit, 
Dear and True! 
Singly dared and done; the climbing both of us 
were bound to do ... 
(1 - 2) 
are a forceful yet poignant declaration of the pilgrimage he made 
to the summit 'Singly' in memory of Miss smith's and his proposed 
venture. It is a symbolic act: a movement upward, suggestive of 
the journey of life. Just as Browning has 'Dared and done' at 
the summit, so his companion has 'dared and done' with life. The 
first intimations of his painful sorrow of her earthly loss are 
revealed where he compares the abyss between the summit to the 
barrier separating the living and the dead: 
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- Oh the barrier! 
Yon Profound 
Shrinks beside it,prove~ a pin-point: barrier this, 
without a bound! 
Boundless though it be, I reach you: somehow 
seem to have you here 
- Who are there .... 
. . . howe'er disjoints 
Past from present, no less certain you are here, 
not there .... 
(19 - 22; 24 - 25) 
Amidst the happy recollections of her companionship and 
descriptions of the breathtaking scenery, we sense in the 
introduction the theme of human isolation and desolating 
loneliness, suggesting man's existential situation. Browning's 
individual is alienated from the common throng of humanity, 
distinct from the natural world, feeling but unable to explain 
or rationalize a spiritual reality. Knowing well his own 
limitations, he learns the meaning of his and mankind's solitude. 
Although his Rabbi Ben Ezra, Abt Vogler and Pippa radiate 
optimism, Roma A. King is right when he remarks that • ... for 
the most part, Browning's men and women are confused, disturbed, 
tortured' (1957: 129) . In 'La Saisiaz' Browning's state of mind 
is just this, as he wonders whether Miss Smith's loving and 
modest personality will survive in any other way beyond the 
memories of those few who knew her. The transient quality of 
man's earthly existence and the livings' memories of the dead, 
introduces the main debate of the poem: 
- dared and done to-day 
Climbing, - here I stand: but you - where? 
(138 - 9) 
Browning's primary question in the poem is twofold: 
"Does the soul survive the body? Is there 
God's self, no or yes?" 
(144) 
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Beneath the surface tone of quiet philosophical cogitation, 
we can sense the emotional strain and tension as the poet speaks 
in his own voice on the death of his friend, severe in itself, 
but doubly devastating as a reminder of the earlier death of his 
wife. This personal confrontation with the earthly finality of 
death belies the idea that the poem is merely an intellectual 
exercise in the guise of a literary elegy. In facing death, 
Browning explores his deepest thoughts about life beyond the 
grave and his reasons for belief in immortality. He realises 
that he cannot. find total satisfaction for his quest, but he 
knows nonetheless, that his search will uncover as much truth as 
his human knowledge will allow. 
Well, and wherefore shall it daunt me, when't is 
I myself am tasked, 
When, by weakness weakness questioned, weakly 
answers - weakly asked? 
Weakness never needs be falseness: truth is truth 
in each degree 
- Thunderpealed by God to Nature, whispered 
by my soul to me. 
Nay, the weakness turns to strength and triumphs 
in a truth beyond: 
"Mine is but man's truest answer - how were it 
did God respond?" 
(147 - 52) 
The immediacy and depth of his philosophical debate is given 
force and intensity by the juxtaposition of the events which 
evoked it: the memory of lively discussion shared on the 
'Nineteenth Century Symposium' contrasted with the chill of 
loneliness and terror as he lifts the silent figure of Ann 
Egerton Smith: 
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Did the face, the form I lifted as it lay, reveal the 
loss 
Not alone of life but soul? A tribute to yon 
flowers and moss, 
What of you remains beside? A memory! 
(173 - 75) 
All that remains of her, he speculates, is the memory he has of 
her, which is, of necessity, a unique memory, differing from all 
others. Man, he says, forever proposes problems to be solved 'By 
ourselves alone' (191), even though he will never live to see the 
fruits of his labours, or to discover whether there are fruits at 
all. He asks whether life be not really 'a curse and not a 
b 1 es s i ng ' ( 2 O 6 ) , man's hopes for redress in the next life in 
reality being an amiable illusion of the coward who cannot face 
the nothingness of death: 
Why should I want courage here? 
I will ask and have an answer, - with no favour, 
with no fear, -
From myself. How much, how little, do I inwardly 
believe 
True that controverted doctrine? 
(207 - 10) 
But then Browning draws strength from his two great losses, 
that of the death of Miss Egerton Smith and of Elizabeth, to call 
his Beatrice to his poetic aid. Using Dante's device, he 
examines the problem: 
... I take upon my lips 
Phrase the solemn Tuscan fashioned, and declare the 
soul's eclipse 
Not the soul's extinction? take his "I bell.eve and 
I declare -
Certain am I - from this life I pass into a better, 
there 
Where that lady lives of whom enamoured was 
my soul" - where this 
Other lady, my companion dear and true, she also ist 
(211 - 16) 
The poet will have an answer from himself. lie asks how much he 
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inwardly believes the doctrine of the soul's immortality and 
whether the doctrine is fact or fancy. These questions are 
underpinned by the Beatrice-Elizabeth image which acts as a kind 
of poetic inspiration never far below the emotional surface, 
spurring Browning on to probe the truth 'howe'er it strike' 
( 1 97) . 
Thus ends the opening of the poem, and the main section (217 
- 548) presents the answer. His starting point is, as always, an 
affirmation of his own existence and, by implication, the 
existence of God: 
I have questioned and am answered. Question, 
answer presuppose 
Two points: that the thing itself which questions, 
answers, - is, it knows; 
As it also knows the thing perceived outside itself, 
- a force 
Actual ere its own beginning, operative through 
its course, 
Unaffected by its end, - that this thing likewise 
needs must be; 
Call this - God, then, call that - soul, and both -
the only facts for me. 
Prove them facts? that they o'erpass my power of 
proving, proves them such: 
Fact it is I know I know not something which is 
fact as much. 
(217 - 24) 
Without the introduction of Christian evidences, Browning is 
determined to start with brute facts, that is, with facts which 
he knows certainly but which he is incapable of proving. The two 
facts from which he begins are the thing perceiving and 'the 
thing perceived outside itself'. The thing perceiving is his own 
existence as a being, capable of distinguishing pleasure and 
pain, and a something else which is independent of his existence. 
These two entities he calls 'soul' and 'God' and he wishes to 
discover whether or not the immortality of the soul can be proved 
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or disproved from a consideration of these two facts. But this is 
where Browning's logic tends to become specious. The self I 
not-self distinction may be an adequate experiential foundation 
from which to begin and can be compared with Descartes' 'Cogito 
ergo sum', as is the experience of pleasure an~ pain, but the 
leap from the not-self to God seems logically tenuous. His 
glaring sophistry is evident in his attempting to establish 
unassailability by saying that he does not know the facts, 
whereas the fact is that he knows! Again he makes a similarly 
unacceptable shift from self to soul and I take it that by soul 
he means a spiri tu:al (non-material) entity and not simply a 
thinking entity. Although Browning gives to these constructions, 
thought of as the work of reason and knowledge, the names 'fancy' 
and 'surmise'. he appears to be confusing the concepts of 
knowledge and belief which is strange in view of his earlier 
insistence on their mutual exclusion. Perhaps his confusion 
arises from the fact that his argument is marked by a strong 
sense of the personal and therefore relative character of human 
experience and knowledge. It accepts the subjective synthesis of 
the non-theistic thinkers, though excluding the negations of the 
spiritual (or God~centrednessY on which it rests. Whatever the 
shortcomings in Browning's argument are, we can nevertheless 
detect a greater maturity in his ability to re-cast his earlier 
doctrines of personal (or subjective) truth into a more 
philosophic form. 
Various possible methods of proceeding with his argument are 
canvassed and rejected, some with scorn, some with regret: 
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"We believe" is sighed. I take the cup of 
comfort proffered thus, 
Taste and try each soft ingredient, sweet infusion, 
and discuss 
What their blending may accomplish for the cure 
of doubt, till - slow, 
Sorrowful, but how decided! needs must I o'er-
turn it - so! 
(251 - 54) 
and he guards himself against imposing the verdict of his own 
experience on any other man, believing that all that can be 
certainly known is one's own experience: 
... out of which there crowds con-
jecture manifold, 
But, as knowledge, this comes only - things may 
be as I behold, 
Or may not be, but, without me and above me, 
things there are; 
I myself am what I know not - ignorance which 
proves no bar 
To the knowledge that I am, and, since I am, 
can recognize 
What to me is pain and pleasure: this is sure, 
the rest - surmise. 
(257 - 62) 
Again at the end of this section Browning is at pains to 
re-iterate that he will not pretend to speak for other people, 
only for himself, therefore claiming no objective validity for 
his conclusions. He refuses to assert that his own experience 
and perceptions of what is painful or pleasurable are generally 
true for his fellows. As in 'Christmas-Eve ' and 'Easter-Day' 
Browning again advances a theory of ethical/moral relativity 
which accords with his position of existential choice as the 
basis for morality. 
If my fellows are or are not, what may please 
them and what pain, -
Mere surmise: my own experience - that is know-
ledge, once again! 
(263 - 64) 
This emphasis on personal experience leads into the next 
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section of the poem (265 - 92) where the poet testifies to the 
incompleteness of life and even its preponderating unhappiness. 
Surveying his own experience, he is forced to the conclusion that 
life appears to hold no coherence unless it is viewed as 
probationary: 
- there is no reconciling wisdom with a 
world distraught, 
Goodness with triumphant evil, power with fail-
ure in the aim, 
If - (to my own sense, remember! though none 
other feel the same!) -
If you bar me from assuming earth to be a pupil's 
place, 
And life, time, - with all their chances, changes, 
- just probation-space .... 
(266 - 70) 
This idea of life as 'probation-space' stands as one of the 
corner stones of Browning's religious thought; a theme previously 
demonstrated in 'Christmas-Eve' and 'Easter-Day' and appearing 
again in 'La Saisiaz'. And this 'probation-space', each man 
being given simply his own knowledge which stands on his 
experience, must evolve an order out of seeming incoherence. His 
task is to learn as best he can 'What is beauteous and what ugly, 
right to strive for, right to shun,/ Fit to help and fit to 
hinder' ( 283 - 4) ' to 'understand so much as may be 
understood' (286). 
It may therefore appear that Browning regards truth as 
relative, placing an experiencing subject in such a central 
position as to constitute solipsism. But, as Harty correctly 
maintains: 
... to the solipsist, the self is not merely central in 
the universe, it is the entire universe, since nothing 
exists apart from it. Browning on the other hand, 
posits a self and a not-self ('without me and above me, 
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t h i n gs t here are ' ) a 1 t hough t he know 1 edge and the 
certainty of the not-self is immanent to the thinking 
self, no appeal being made to empirical or positivist 
criteria of verification. Furthermore, Browning 
insists, what he knows as the not-self is, simply, God. 
It follows that the perceived universe of apparently 
independent objects belongs either to God's existence or 
to the thinking subjects existence, and that its 
independence is illusory. 
(1981: 219) 
Thus knowledge for Browning is of pragmatic value, to be 
used in the living out of one's life. Knowledge is a means of 
discerning the good and evil in the world, and so is the 
determining factor in matters of choice. But the actual choice 
of action remains the really decisive human action. Hope itself, 
whether in life or in an afterlife, is a mode of knowledge and so 
has also to be used, like all theological virtues. At the end of 
this section of the poem the poet then judges the power, wisdom 
and benevolence of the Creator in the world of his own 
experience, a judgement of whether man is happy or not: 
Solve the problem: "From thine apprehended 
scheme of things, deduce 
Praise or blame of its contriver, shown a niggard 
or profuse 
In each good or evil issue! nor miscalculate alike 
Counting one the other in the final balance, 
which to strike, 
Soul was born and life allotted: ay, the show of 
things unfurled 
For thy summing-up and judgement, - thine, no 
other mortal's world!" 
(287 - 92) 
Immediately, the poet finds the world of his own experience 
is filled with paradoxes, irrationalities and incoherence, things 
which are difficult to reconcile with God's attributes of wisdom, 
goodness and power. Now the poet faces the theological dilemma 
which has disturbed others before him: 
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- did He lack power or was the 
will in fault 
When He let blue heaven be shrouded o'er by 
vapours of the vault, 
Gay earth drop her garlands shrivelled at the 
first infecting breath 
Of the serpent pains which herald, swarming in, 
the dragon death? 
{303 - 6) 
This is based on the third datum or •given' : the 
experience of pain and pleasure. Thus Browning meets the problem 
of evil and the world's misery as reality, but with his 
optimistic attitude he refuses to give up the belief that man, 
the creation of God, is really a reflection of the greatness of 
his maker. Man has a dignity of his own, arising from the power 
of free will which he exerts in the moral struggle. 
Browning seems to vacillate between a pessimistic, 
deterministic view of his personal experience of life (see lines 
333 - 35 quoted overleaf) and a tenacious belief in the idea of a 
universal benevolent order, with man as a morally free person 
within that order. The flaw in his argument runs thus - If God 
were all loving, He would wish to destroy evil and eliminate all 
misery, and if He were all powerful He could do so. The idea of 
such a God is inconsistent with the existence of evil. Yet if a 
man is to have a free will, there must be evil for him to 
discriminate against and to fight against. 
If we regard this life as final we must relinquish our 
conception of the power of God, for His work is then open to 
human judgement, and therefore can yield only imperfect results. 
But if we regard our present state as one of probation, evil and 
misery are no longer a mark of failure in the execution of the 
Divine Scheme: they become essential to it, and Browning's 
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experience represents it as such: 
can we love but on condition, that the thing we love 
must die? 
Needs there groan a world in anguish ju:st to 
teach us sympathy -
Multitudinously wretched that we, wretched too, 
may guess 
What a preferable state were universal 
happiness? 
(311 - 14} 
The poet cannot conceive evil as abolished without 
abrogation of the laws of life. For it is not only bound u:p with 
all the good of life, it is often its vehicle. Gain he believes 
is enhanced by recent loss, ignorance places us nearest to 
knowledge, truth is potent where ugliness and falsehood prevail. 
What but the loss of love teaches u:s what its true value has 
been? 
To the rationalist or those who groan in an anguished world 
suffering under famine, oppression and horrific wars, 'pie in the 
sky' arguments are neither rational nor popular. But looking at 
the matter logically, the hypothetical syllogism 'll God is 
all-loving and omnipotent, then there mu:st be an after-life of 
happiness' depends on the truth of the hypothetical premise, and 
this can only be affirmed or refuted after death. So the whole 
matter remains essentially and necessarily conjectural, as 
Browning concludes at the end of the debate between Fancy and 
Reason. In fact Browning admits that the woes (and he again 
speaks for himself) of our present existence far exceed the 
joys: 
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Only my own joys and sorrows now to reckon 
real instead, -
I must say - or choke in silence - "Howsoever 
came my fate, 
Sorrow did and joy did nowise, - life well weighed, 
- preponderate." 
(332 - 35) 
Henry Duffin takes this statement as 'mean-spirited in tone and 
monstrous as a statement of fact' (1956:216}, proceeding to give 
reasons as to why he considers De Vane and Knickerbocker's 
(1951: 3) justification of Browning's 'fair share of suffering' 
unjustified. The aforementioned critics ennumerate a number of 
reasons for this, namely, the misunderstand1ng of critics, the 
long delay of recognition, the sense of failure, financial 
anxieties, Elizabeth's poor health and early death, his lonely 
later years, and the failure of his son, Pen, to live up to his 
father's expectations. Duffin states that these tribulations are 
no more than the ordinary person has to bear. But surely Duffin 
misses the point that life receives its value not from itself 
alone, but from its significant relation to the eternal, and if 
Browning judges God's qualities of benevolence, omniscience and 
omnipotence purely on the evidences of this world, then He must 
seem as limited in power as man. 'Goodness, wisdom, power, all 
bounded, each a human attribute!' (348). Of course, there are 
those theists who will affirm this outlook, maintaining that the 
act of creation pe~ se limits God's power because He no longer 
exhausts all Being. If there is God and not-God, then He cannot 
possess the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience. In other 
words, our very existence undermines the God-dynamic. 
But Browning is able to endure the sufferings of this world 
in the hope, which for him is grounded in certainty, of a life to 
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come: 
Only grant a second life, I 
acquiesce 
In this present life as failure, count misfortune's 
worst assaults 
Triumph, not defeat, assured that loss so much 
the more exalts 
Gain about to be ... 
While for love - Oh how but, losing love, does 
whoso loves succeed 
By the death-pang to the birth-throe-learning 
what is love indeed? 
(358 - 61; 365 - 66) 
In his bid for assurance of a life to come, he interrupts 
his propositions by returning to personal events which have so 
recently deeply affected him. He wishes that not knowledge, but 
his heart (intuition) would assure him of another meeting with 
those who are now hidden from his sight, by 'Yonder precinct 
which henceforward holds and hides the Dear and True' (386). His 
language becomes more reliant on metaphor, more vivid and 
passionate, interspersed with exclamatory interjections as he 
pleads with God to: 
Grant me (once again) assurance we shall each 
meet each some day, 
Walk - but with how boid a footstep! on a way 
- but what a way! 
- Worst were best, defeat were triumph, utter loss 
were utmost gain. 
Can it be, and must, and will it? 
(387 - 90) 
This forceful and spontaneous utterance from the heart 
Browning suddenly silences as if to rein in his emotions by 
declaring in his final enquiry that he will accept only the 
testimony of 'fact's self' (393), the basic premises of the 
existence of God and the soul, surmise is rejected; he seeks no 
answer in the beauties or voices of nature, none in the minds of 
82 
his fellow men, none even in the depths of his 'sentient self' 
(398), with its 'aspiration' and 'reminiscence' (399), its 
plausible assurances that God would be 'unjust' and men 'wronged' 
(400) if a second life were not granted to us. The 'fact's self' 
forces man at the end to fall back on the 'half-escape:/ "We 
believe"' (250 - 1). All we can be certain of is our self-
consciousness and our own experience. Or, as Browning puts it, 
'my own experience - that is knowledge'(264); 'this is sure, the 
rest - surmise' (262). And one man's experience is not that of 
another. Time after time, the speaker makes the point that no 
man can teach others how to live or what to believe. Yet the 
uniqueness of personality and personal experience does not 
that truth is relative. Experience must help a man decide, 
imply 
the 
earth being a giant teaching machine from which to learn what is 
beautiful, right and good (274 - 85). In the same way the 
speaker's own experience has taught him that what is beautiful, 
right and good cannot be reconciled with the ignorance, evil and 
failure he finds wherever he looks. The only way in which he can 
resolve the problem is to see earthly experience as a prelude to 
something better. 
If this is the case, what then may 'fact's self' reveal? 
Just as God must stand as referee ''twixt man and me' (278), so 
the speaker's soul will be umpire between the surmises of Fancy 
and the conclusions of Reason in their debate on the question of 
immortality. In other words, Browning reverts to interior 
dialogue such as characterised 'Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau', 
dividing himself into two persons to do battle with each other. 
Through the interior dialogue, Browning has his speaker discover 
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within himself 'the truth' of his views about life. Thus, 
although he rejects the spontaneous utterance of his own spirit, 
he also relies on its conclusions. He rejects it as pleader but 
constitutes it a judge and this distinction is carried out in a 
dialogue in which Fancy speaks for the spontaneous self, Reason 
for the judicial the one making its thrusts and the other 
parrying them. The question at issue has, however, slightly 
shifted its ground and the poet finds himself asking, not 'Is the 
soul immortal?' but, 'What would be the consequences to life of 
its being proved so?' 
This becomes the heart of the poem and I will show how the 
colloquium between Fancy and Reason leads to the climax of the 
double epiphanic moment. Argument held an irresistible 
fascination for Browning and as a powerful casuist he was 
pre-eminent in poetry. In this section he reverts to his 
favoured way of speaking through a dramatic mask. This mode 
enables him to present all sides and eventually sift the grain of 
truth from the chaff of falsehood. This ability, I believe, 
gives him his unique power and value as a Christian poet. 
Critics agree that 'fancy' in the context of this poem means 
'surmise' or 'hypothesis', rather than the Romantic notion of the 
creative imagination that Browning employed in The Ring and the 
Book. Philip Drew rightly remarks that "Fancy usually means 
'the right to make assumptions which can be shown to be necessary 
to the debate'" (1970: 161). Since assumptions are 'necessary' 
they have the status of certainties or 'facts'. Although Reason 
and Fancy wage war, their 'war' is 'amicable' and they 'play the 
foe', actually co-operating in the search for truth, as the 
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dialogue which follows suggests. 
In the debate Fancy proposes several secondary facts which 
can be inferred from the primary facts of knowledge of oneself 
and of God. Reason offers justification for Fancy's propositions, 
corroborating them by demonstrating their pragmatic and 
psychological value. Fancy finds no 'certainty' more plain, but 
it is of course a surmised certainty: 
I concede the thing refused: henceforth 
no certainty more plain 
Than this mere surmise that after body dies soul 
1 i ves again. 
Two, the only facts acknowledged late, are now 
increased to three -
God is, and the soul is, and, as certain, after death 
shall be. 
(405 - 8) 
Reason agrees, promising that 'Life to come will be improvement 
on the life that's now.' (4f1) but the 'use' of it will be that 
the wise man will take his own life, since death, in the absence 
of any supernatural law to the contrary must be clear gain! 
There is some sense of humour in Reason's antithetical 
proposals that we should invoke death as the deliverer from our 
happiness or sadness, as both states lead either to certain decay 
or a weary compromise between hope and fear, between failure and 
attainment. But for the purposes of discussion Fancy and Reason 
agree to the postulates that there is life after death, that 
suicide is forbidden, that life is the testing ground for a 
future life, and that the moral law must be discernible but not 
imposed on man to preclude freedom of choice: 
Present life is judged in aught man counts advantage 
- be it hope, 
Be it fear that brightens, blackens most or least 
his horoscope, -
He, by absolute compulsion such as made him 
live at all, 
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Go on living to the fated end of life whate'er be-
fall. 
What though, as on earth he darkling grovels, 
man descry the sphere, 
Next life's - call it, heaven or freedom, close above 
and crystal-clear? 
He shall find - say, hell to punish who in aught 
curtails the term, 
Fain would act the butterfly before he has played 
out the worm. 
God, soul, earth, heaven, hell, - five facts now: 
what is to desiderate? 
(457 - 65) 
'Nothing' (466), Reason responds, promising that 'soon shall 
things be unperplexed/And the right and wrong, now tangled, lie 
unravelled in the next' (473 - 4). We must note parenthetically 
that Browning worries as little about precise definitions of 
heaven in Fancy's argument as he does elsewhere about the meaning 
of 'soul' and 'God'. Although the alleged reality must of 
necessity be communicated in language, precise terminology is not 
Browning's primary concern. He refuses to make words signify one 
denotative meaning. Instead, the signifier may assume meaning in 
the mind of each reader. Thus each respondent comes to his own 
definition of 'heaven', 'soul' and 'God'. 
Fancy moves on, conceding more still, to the fact that man 
shall not only be compelled to live, he shall know the value of 
life. Every moment he spends in it is gain or loss for the life 
to come - every act he performs involves reward or punishment in 
it. What is implied here is certain knowledge of a comprehensive 
moral code: 
... not alone do 
I declare 
Life must needs be borne, - I also will that man 
become aware 
Life has worth incalculable, every moment that 
he spends 
So much gain or loss for that next life which on 
this life depends. 
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Good, done here, be there rewarded, - evil, worked 
here, there amerced! 
(475 - 79) 
Fancy and Reason have now reached the point where they agree 
that if moral laws are known as certainly as natural laws, there 
is no freedom of choice. The liberty to do evil depends on the 
existence of doubt and uncertainty in relation to moral norms. 
No man is good because he obeys a law so obvious and so stringent 
as to leave him no choice, and such would be the moral law if 
punishment were demonstrated as following upon the breaking of 
it, reward on its fulfilment. Doing evil would be as difficult 
as to stop breathing and doing good would have no more merit than 
in breathing regularly. The thrust of the argument is that 
certainty in the moral sphere reduces morality to the same level 
as natural law. Man can claim no credit for it: 
- Prior to this last announcement, earth was man's 
probation-place: 
Liberty of doing evil gave his doing good a 
grace. 
(491 - 92) 
Browning's thoughts expressed here can perhaps be traced back to 
a letter he wrote to Elizabeth on September 25, 1845 where he 
discusses the problems of man's freedom of choice according to 
his knowledge of moral laws: 
The partial indulgence, the proper exercise of one's 
faculties, there is the difficulty and problem for 
solution, set by Providence which might have made the 
laws of Religion as indubitable as those of vitality, 
and revealed the articles of belief as certainly as that 
condition, for instance, by which we breathe so many 
times a minute to support life. But there is no reward 
proposed for the feat of breathing, and a great one for 
that of believing - consequently there must go a great 
deal more of voluntary effort to this latter than is 
implied in the getting absolutely rid of it at once, by 
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adopting the direction of an infallible church, or 
private judgement of another - for all our life is some 
form of religion, and all our action some belief, and 
there is but one law, however modified, for the greater 
and the less. 
(Kintner, 1969: 213) 
The debate has now reached a virtual impasse with Fancy's 
argument having in fact collapsed. Here one can detect marked 
similarities in Browning's argument to that used in 'Easter-Day' 
where he maintains that a doubt-free faith is a contradiction in 
terms. He ingeniously overturns Reason by using it against itself 
to show his lack of faith in man's rational faculties. We cannot 
through knowledge, and therefore certainty, prove a future life 
from first premises, nor do we have an adequate explanation for 
the imperfections of this world. All we can know is that only in 
man's present state of imperfection and limited knowledge is a 
life of probation conceivable; while only on the hypothesis that 
this life is one of probation can that of a future existence be 
maintained. Thus, the poet believes that the imperfection of 
man's state becomes a necessary condition for the immortality of 
the soul. This may be true for Browning, but immortality is not 
a necessary consequence of this condition and we are forced to 
conclude that an after-life is not provable from first premises. 
There can be no certainty on the matter. What stance then must 
one adopt? Should one hope and act as if the 'surmise' were 
'fact'? 
Soul is bound to pass probation, prove its 
powers, and exercise 
Sense and thought on fact, and then, from fact 
educing fit surmise, 
Ask itself, and of itself have solely answer, 
"Does the scope 
Earth affords of fact to judge by warrant future 
fear or hope?" 
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(521 - 24) 
It is thus made clear that only in a man's present state of 
limited knowledge is a life of probation conceivable, while only 
on the hypothesis that this life is one of probation, can that of 
a future existence be maintained. 
Thus concludes the main section of the poet's philosophical 
and metaphysical speculation with a return to the original 
question: 
Thus have we come back full circle: fancy's 
footsteps one by one 
Go their round conducting reason to the point 
where they begun .... 
(525 - 26) 
Browning then returns to the personal, imploring Miss 
Egerton Smith for some assurance from beyond the grave. Knowing 
this to be a fruitless exercise, he consoles himself with the 
realisation that for the ultimate questions of life certainty and 
proof are impossible. Nonetheless, though there is no absolute 
assurance, he can at least hope: 
So, I hope - no more than hope, but hope - no 
less than hope, because 
I can fathom, by no plumb line sunk in life's 
apparent laws, 
How I may in any instance fix where change 
should meetly fall 
Nor involve, by one revisal, abrogation of them 
all. ... 
(535 - 3$) 
It should be noted that Browning's 'hope' is not simply a 
vague feeling of looking on the bright side of things, but more 
in line with the Pauline 'hope' constituting certainty. That is 
why he gives such prominence to the concept by building up its 
force at the conclusion to the main part of the poem. A modest 
'no more than hope' is followed immediately by a more emphatic 
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'no less than hope' leading up to a final triumphant 'hope'. 
Because of hope he is not left entirely without consolation in 
his darkness: 
Hope the arrowy, just as constant, comes to 
pierce its gloom, compelled 
By a power and by a purpose which, if no one 
else beheld, 
I behold in life, so - hope! 
(543 - 45} 
His exultant tone at the end is not merely a vague feeling 
of encouragement to himself, but is born out of a conclusion 
reached after all the alternative positions have been 
systematically scrutinised and found unacceptable. Again, his 
emphasis is exclusive, 'if no one else beheld, / I behold' 
reminding the reader that it is his empirical knowledge that 
leads him to hope. 
But at this high point he suddenly imagines his audience's 
sad, sceptical comments as their search for a 'message' is 
unfulfilled. This leads Browning to speculate, with a certain 
envy, on the literary fame and 'magnetic virtue' (547) of those 
masters of despair such as Rousseau, Byron, Gibbon and Voltaire. 
They bewitched the world not by their irresistible reasoning but 
with their persuasive rhetoric. Browning wonders whether he has 
not the right to choose hope, as other men have the right to 
choose despair. 'Knowledge stands on my experience' ( 272}. 
It is then that the first epiphanic moment breaks when he 
wishes for the attributes of these famous men, to make his 
statement to the multitude: 
Confidently lay to heart and lock in head their 
life long - this: 
"He there with the brand flamboyant, broad o'er 
90 
night's forlorn abyss, 
Crowned by prose and verse; and wielding, with 
Wit's bauble, Learning's rod ... 
Well? Why, he at least believed in Soul, was 
very sure of God. 
(601 - 4) 
This ironic revelation, it will be remembered, is grounded 
on the two 'brute facts' which originally began his reflections -
'soul' and 'God'. Browning's belief in the soul precedes the 
assurance of God and, in complementary fashion, the redoubled 
affirmative, 'very sure of God', summons the authority of an 
ontological essence, outside the self that implies faith as its 
grounding object. Thus it can be observed that the two halves of 
this statement are interdependent, as the latter predicate 
affirms in terms of objective certitude what the former affirms 
as subjective experience. 
The experience on Mt Saleve was subsequently relived in 
Browning's mind six weeks later in 'London's mid-November' (606) 
when he could recollect the event in relative tranquillity; when 
the pain of the experience had become less immediate. out of 
these memories emerges a second, more powerful, epiphanic moment, 
which I believe has far more spiritual significance than most 
critics accord it. It is true that in the passage of time the 
poet suppressed the memories, 'bore it in my breast I Safe thus 
far' (609 - 10), fearing to expose himself to the power of those 
thoughts once he set them down. But the power of his poetry leads 
him not only to live the tragedy over again with its double 
poignancy of Miss Egerton Smith's death and reminders of his 
wife~s, but to experience a second moment of enlightenment. The 
'insubstantial pageant' fades and the sweet memories are caught 
up in a greater moment of revelation where Browning is left 
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amazed before the immensity of the divine attributes~ 
... Least part this: then what the whole? 
(618) 
Although the first half of the sentence may be yet another 
affirmation of man's limited knowledge while on earth, it is 
counterbalanced by Browning's idea of God revealed as immanent 
and transcendent and the poet eagerly awaits the eschatological 
verification of his epiphanies. In so doing, he gives expression 
to man's inherent need to grow towards a future which promises 
greater possibilities than the present. Hope, here at the end 
becomes objectified as Future. Right from the poet~s yearning 
after God in 'Pauline' and Paracelsus's 'tendency to God' (773) 
to Johannes Agricola's belief that ''tis to God I speed so fast' 
(7), it is evident that Browning conceives of God as both above 
and ahead of men, attracting them upwards towards a greater 
realisation of their potential and a compulsion onwards towards 
the future. 
Although 'La Saisiaz' can be seen as an intellectual 
exercise with many of the arguments leading nowhere except to a 
pre-arranged dead-end, the ironical effect of it shows the total 
inefficacy of words to describe and define God. Browning is 
convinced that words function as inadequate symbols; that 'the 
whole' cannot be signified, as it lies beyond present reality, 
beyond any rational belief and reason. 
If the poem represents only part of his reflections on life 
and death, then how much greater must be those unexpressed. He 
has said all that he is capable of saying metaphysically. Having 
rested his argument on personal experience ('fact') he is 
unwilling to offer for public consumption his most overwhelming 
argument ('fancy') for immortality namely, his love for 
Elizabeth and his confidence that, that love transcends death 
itself. Ryals (1975: 157) proposes that the Prologue was written 
after the main part of the poem, representing Browning's release 
from the sombre mood displayed in his tangled arguments. "Good, 
to forgive; I Best, to forget!' (1 - 2) gives voice to the 
sentiments expressed in the last lines of the coda. our 
knowledge of what lies beyond the grave may be incomplete, but at 
least the soul is set free, untrammelled by the woes of mortal 
existence. Cares for fame and doubts about survival may now be 
abandoned. 
'La Saisiaz' deals with Browning's speculations on the 
nature of knowledge. If this is so, then 'The Two Poets of 
Croisic' is his statement of belief culminating in an affirmation 
of life and love. Davies in his article 'From Knowledge to Belief 
in "La Saisiaz: The Two Poets of Croisic"' makes the point that 
the latter poem was begun on November 10, 1877, a day after the 
completion of 'La Saisiaz'. Although the two poems differ 
radically in style they should be read together in terms of their 
thematic and stylistic progression. This is in keeping with 
Browning's familiar artistic insistence on continuity, 
progression and unity within the dynamic structures of his 
poetry: 
The two poems complement each other; they should not be 
read exclusively of one another; in fact, they ask to be 
considered as companion pieces. The epilogue should be 
read as an epilogue to the complete volume, and the two 
prologues should initiate the progressive reading. 
(1978: 12) 
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Davies' main thrust in his article is that Browning, in 
challenging his reader, was inviting the Positivist, Frederic 
Harrison, responsible for the essays entitled 'On the Soul and 
Future Life', to participate directly in the total movement of 
the volume. Just as Browning, in part, wrote 'La Saisiaz' in 
order to defend the high seriousness of poetry against Harrison's 
charges of 'mere paltering with a loose fancy' (Davies, 1978: 
11), so 'The Two Poets' is, in part, a further defence against 
the dangerously limiting view of poetry held by Harrison. The 
more light-hearted tone of most of the latter poem is Browning's 
answer to the reader and to Harrison that the serious subjects of 
death and immortality, knowledge and belief, can be addressed 
within ever-shifting and ever-enlarging contexts. 
But my main point is that the double epiphanic moment which 
emanated from a largely hypothetical discussion in 'La Saisiaz' 
finds its true resolution in 'The Two Poets'. Browning 
deliberately carries over the words 'fact' and 'fancy', 'truth' 
and 'know' when early in the poem he describes the poetic process 
in the extended fire metaphor: 
Launched by our ship-wood, float we, once adrift 
In fancy to that land-strip waters wash, 
We both know well! .... 
. . . What we have sailed to see, then, wafted there 
By fancy from the log that ends its days 
Of much adventure 'neath skies foul or fair .... 
(73 - 5: 129 - 31) 
Then again the unresolved epistemological problems concerning 
'fact' and 'fancy' raised in 'La Saisiaz' find their poetic 
resolution now in the conclusion to the problems of hope and 
fear, and knowledge and doubt in stanza CLVIII: 
94 
Who knows most, doubts most; entertaining hope, 
Means recognizing fear; the keener sense 
Of all comprised within our actual scope 
Recoils from aught beyond earth's dim and dense. 
Who, grown familiar with the sky, will grope 
Henceforward among groundlings? That's offence 
Just as indubitably: stars abound 
O'erhead~ but then - what flowers make glad the ground! 
(1257 - 64) 
'The poet's face/ Radiant ... ' (1271 - 2) at the end of the 
poem finally leaves Browning's audience to respond to a tempered 
but joyful affirmation of life and the 'live pretender' (1280) 
will continue to sing for the sake of love and will be 
indifferent to present fame. The epiphany finds its final 
expression in the playful but deep epilogue about love, echoing 
the prologue where Browning's belief is the key to his hope not 
only for the future life, but for his poetic achievement in the 
present as well. He is 'very sure of God' when the embodiment of 
love, in the face of his beloved Elizabeth Barrett Browning 
appears as confirmation of 'God's own smile' (11). 
Thus responsive readers of the unified volume will be 
satisfactorily rewarded by an investigation of their own into 
what Browning leaves for our consideration concerning the 
understanding of fancy, fact, truth, knowledge, doubt, belief and 
love through the medium of poetic expression. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In the preceding chapters of this dissertation I have 
attempted to debate the nature and structure of the epiphanic 
experience and show how it is revealed in three of Browning's 
religious poems. 
Firstly, the epiphanic experience may be prepared for over 
long periods of time through the poet's inner debate, but when 
the experience does come, it is not gradual but immediate. The 
sudden manifestation is a 'spiritual' one, whether emanating from 
an apparent external divine force revealing the truth, or from 
the mind. I tend to disagree with modern critics such as 
Beja (1971), Langbaum (1971) and Nichols (1987), who see in the 
modern movement a secularisation of epiphany, in that an epiphany 
may occur from the ord1nary experiences of life rather than from 
the Augustinian moment of divine revelation. Beja remarks that: 
No longer confident (however), of a divine answer, men 
have wanted their own; no longer willing to wait for 
Truth unt i 1 God cal ls them to it, they have sought for 
it today, on earth, here and now. There has been a 
general secularization of what one has inevitably 
regarded as the divinely inspired moment of new 
knowledge .... 
(1971: 21) 
My problem lies particularly with the phrase 'men have 
wanted their own'; as if we are somehow separate from our divine 
source, having no intimate connection to God. It is true that the 
Romantic tradition moved away from man's perception of the divine 
centre of things as he became less preoccupied with God and more 
interested in man; less amazed by supernatural visitants than by 
the power of the poet; less concerned with the object perceived 
than with the perceptive subject; less appreciative of grace and 
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more fascinated by the imagination. Bu:t I contend that whether 
the epiphanic moment originates from an external source or the 
mind, both experiences are mutually inclusive because they 
emanate from the same spiritual source. In other words, I 
believe that dod may work through external events affecting our 
lives or from within through our minds and intuitions. 
Here I tend to take Emerson's point of view that, 'the 
aroused intellect', when it confronts 'facts, dull, strange, 
despised things', finds 'that a fact is an Epiphany of God' 
(Spiller and Williams, 1971, 3: 47). This idea of transcending 
time and coming upon a 
grounded in the power of 
itself, rather than being 
new vision in a profound moment is 
inner light emanating from the mind 
dependent, as in earlier orthodox 
religion, upon divine visitation or manifestation. 
Secondly, epiphany comes in the moment of interpretation 
rather than in the moment of vision. There may be an initial 
sense of wonder, amazement and empowerment but the realization of 
its effects comes in the moment of recollection. Although in 
'Christmas-Eve' the epiphanic moment is more a vision in the 
traditional sense, coming from an external source, we are not 
sure whether this is an actu:al experience or a dream sequence 
from the speaker's subconscious. Added to this, the speaker 
witnesses only a partial vision of Christ where he sees only His 
robe. The speaker's epiphanic moment 'proper' occurs when he is 
returned to the Dissenter's chapel. 'Easter-Day~ acts as a kind 
of transition between the traditional vision of 'Christmas-Eve' 
and the epiphanic moments in 'La Saisiaz' which arise ou:t of 
intellectual debate between 'Fancy' and 'Reason'. In 'Easter-Day' 
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there is a subtle combination of vision and argument, again, 
within a dream sequence. The later poem 'La Saisiaz' demonstrates 
a double epiphany: the moment on the mountain where the speaker 
concludes that, 'he at least believed in Soul, was very sure of 
God.' (604) and then back in London where he realizes his partial 
understanding of life after death and an anticipation of 'the 
whole' (618) of eternity. His full understanding of the double 
epiphany is finally concluded in 'The Two Poets of Croisic' where 
love for his fellows and hope in the Eternal are the only gifts 
given to men in this present reality. 
Thus in a sense, epiphany is a retrospective experience 
where the moment of illumination or revelation comes in the 
interpretation of the subject who experiences it. The 
insubstantial pageant fades and is recollected in tranquillity, 
revealing the open-ended dialectic that informs much of 
Browning's poetry. Browning's very scepticism, his theology of 
doubt, contributes to his own epiphany as a speaking self in his 
progression towards the infinite. It corresponds to the 
potentially infinite process that frames hermeneutic 
consciousness and to the rhetorical entanglements in which his 
poetry involves the reader. Consequently, my approach to 
epiphany and epiphanic discourse dissents from the majority 
opinion (for example, Whitla (1963) and Nichols (1987)) in which 
Browning's 'good minute' becomes an 'infinite moment' 
constituting a timeless transcendence of contingency. Whitla 
contends that in Browning, 'the moment of vision is also the 
moment of Incarnation', which 'gives significance to the whole 
poem' (1963: 17), but this standard formulation elides the role 
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of interpretation in determining 'significance'. For, in 
epiphanic poetics, opposed to an incarnational one, stress falls 
on the moment not of vision but of reading. 
Thus the conception of the epiphanic experience in Browning 
emerges from a post-structuralist theory: 'manifestation itself 
does not reveal a presence, it makes a sign' (Derrida 1976: 49); 
'The symbolic manifestation of a thing is a matrix of symbolic 
meaning as words ... The manifestation through the thing is like 
the condensation of an infinite discourse' (Ricoeur 1967: 11). 
The 'thing' or 'sign' in acts of epiphanic contextualization 
constitutes what Bornstein describes as a 'continual tension 
between the public prophetic stance and the private concern for 
lyrical moments' (1988: 121) and Browning invites the reader to 
experience his own epiphanic moment. What the interpretation of 
an epiphanic moment manifests in the final analysis is the 
character psychological or formalist, deconstructive or 
historicist - of its interpreter. Beja remarks: 
The artist has accomplished his full task only when an 
epiphany produces a revelation of nature, when fiction 
illuminates reality, when literature becomes experience. 
(1971: 232) 
Thus, despite the limitations of language the artist attempts not 
merely to record epiphanies but to produce or reproduce them, 
bringing about the effect not so much of communication as of 
revelation in the mind of the reader. When all is said, the end 
of the text is the epiphany of the reader, when he/she is 
sensitized through a series of associations in the work of art, 
to produce an epiphany in himself/herself. Thus it can be said 
that epiphany dissolves the distinction between art and life, 
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allowing the epiphanic moment encapsulated in the work of art, to 
take place in the beholder of that art. Langbaum quotes Bergson's 
description of what an epiphany might produ:ce: 
Our ideas and sensations succed each other with 
increased rapidity.... Finally, in extreme joy-, our 
perceptions and memories acquire an indefinable quality, 
comparable to heat and light, and so new, that at 
certain moments, returning upon ourselves, we experience 
an astonishment of being .... 
(1987: 51) 
Although the three poems under discussion are examples of 
Browning's more personal voice, where he drops the mask u:sed in 
the dramatic monologue, they exhibit that same blend of objective 
uncertainty about universal truths and subjective certitude based 
on personal experience which is endemic to all his poetry. He 
could not proclaim a message of certainty to all men, nor was he 
prepared to utter a message of despair. His message was a 
qualified 'I don't know'. Isobel Armstrong aptly calls it 
'creative agnosticism' (1993: 14). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the two subjects I 
have selected for enquiry in this dissertation, namely Robert 
Browning and epiphanic discourse, have both at different times 
this century experienced rejection or remained unexplored. 
However, over the past few decades Browning has been restored to 
his position as a Victorian poet of renown, whose writings are as 
relevant to our own age as to his. 'Christmas-Eve', 'Easter-Day', 
'La Saisiaz', 'Caliban upon Setebos' and 'Death in a Desert', to 
name but a few poems, are studied not only for their poetry, 
but for their insights into religious controversies and questions 
which are still pertinent today, in our age of technological 
revolution. 
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In spite of the trends in both the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries towards 'scientism', 'individualism', 'materialism' and 
'secularism', there is no apparent indication that interest in 
either God or religion, however deviant it may be, has 
diminished. Browning's preoccupation with religious questions 
seems equally pertinent to his time and ours. It is encouraging 
and salutary to note that eminent modern critics such as 
Armstrong and Tucker find points of reference for us in Victorian 
poetry in general, and in Browning in particular. Armstrong 
notes that: 
Rereading Victorian poetry, (then) involves a 
reconsideration of the way we conceptualise history and 
culture, and the way we see the politics of poetry. It 
also involves rethinking some of the major criticisms of 
this century, Marxist and feminist criticism and 
deconstruction, and considering how the language and 
form of Victorian poetry questions the theories they 
have developed. 
(1993: 17 - 18) 
Tucker views Browning as an important precursor of future poets 
within his own century, such as the Rossettis, Hopkins and 
Swinburne, and those of the twentieth century such as Hardy and 
Yeats. He boldly claims that Browning is now generally 
acknowledged to be the Victorian poet who has 'exerted the 
greatest influence on poetry written in English during the 
present century' (1980: 3). It is my hope that interest in 
Browning's poetry and in Browning scholarship will continue to 
flourish as long as man continues to search for meaning in his 
life. 
And what of the future of epiphanic discourse as an 
acknowledged theory within the parameters of literary criticism? 
From its classical and religious roots through the Romantic 
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phase, conceived chiefly in Wordsworth's 'spots of time', to 
Browning's 'good moment' and on to Joyce's epiphanic theory, the 
intrinsic experience of an unforgettable moment of miraculous 
revelation has changed little. What has evolved is the 
situatedness of the experience into ordinary commonplace 
existence. The interpretation thereof avoids any attempt at 
closure thereby initiating in artist and reader alike a variety 
of meanings. The modern spirit of epiphany has also tended 
towards decontextualization and become more impersonally 
streamlined in interior monologues and the stream-of-
consciousness technique. Writers such as Virginia Woolf, William 
Faulkner and Joseph Conrad are among these modern practitioners. 
This is in contrast to the Browningesque model of character made 
manifest in the language and ideology of a conditioning time and 
place. 
Epiphanic exploration enjoyed popularity when it spread from 
Joycean scholarship to the New Criticism at mid-century. But the 
use the New Critics made of epiphany was essentialist and 
a-historical, as was their sense of the literary backgroun4 from 
which the term emerge~ in the modernist period. The alleged 
non-ideological poetics and pedagogy of the New Criticism tilted 
against Romanticism and all else thereafter. Moreover, Tucker 
finds it somewhat ironic that • ... given the frequently Christian 
complexion of their work they also slighted the scriptural 
tradition from which the term ultimately derives' (1992: 1209). 
With the displacement of the New Criticism in the late 1960s by 
structuralist theories with their linguistic emphasis, and then 
by the decentered read'ings of deconstruction, epiphanic discourse 
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fell into academic neglect. Nowadays, while scholarly enquiry 
into and sophisticated criticism of epiphany has grown faint in 
the academe, the word and concept seem to be flourishing in a 
popular and colloquial idiom in book review columns, first person 
narratives and writers' workshops. Perhaps this is an indication 
to the 'ivory tower league' to extend their bounds of literary 
practice from exclusively rhetorical and textual concerns to a 
broader cultural pertinence. To make connections between 
empirical actuality and literary practice in a world which is 
becoming ever increasingly expansively integrated may help to 
initiate the rehabilitation of epiphanic discourse. It would be 
an interesting study to investigate whether the nature of the 
epiphanic experience is a universally similar phenomenon or 
whether it is grounded in particular cultural constructs. But 
this question lies outside the bounds of this dissertation. 
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